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ABSTRACT 
The National Cyber Incident Response Plan stipulates the state homeland security advisor 
as the contact point for a significant cyber incident. But this may not be the most 
effective method of response because the state homeland security advisors are not domain 
experts for cyberspace. A questionnaire was sent to state chief information officers and/or 
state chief information security officers to determine current capability and procedures 
for responding to a national cybersecurity incident. Nineteen states replied with 227 
responses relating to information sharing between states and the federal government; use 
of established cybersecurity event and response definitions, coordination and control 
mechanisms, and terms; use of risk-based approaches to cyber incident planning, 
including remediation based on workflows and procedures; establishment of thresholds 
when predefined boundaries are crossed; and instigation of varying courses of action. As 
a result of the survey, the author recommends increasing knowledge and information 
flow between state and federal agencies regarding national cyber incidents; the 
establishment of regional cybersecurity hubs throughout the nation; and the creation of a 
national cyber incident teleconferencing network and prearranged protocols for 
situational awareness and communication of courses of action following a cybersecurity 
incident. 
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Cybersecurity is a shared responsibility, and each of us has a role to play. 
Emerging cyberthreats require the engagement of the entire society. This includes 
government, law enforcement, the private sector, and most importantly, members of the 
public.  
To address the states’ role, this research reviewed the states’ cybersecurity 
engagements for cyber incident responses to national significant cyber incidents. 
“National Significant Cyber Incidents” will be defined later.  
Through a series of questions posed to the states and a literature review, the 
research was designed to understand response constructs, risk models, and alerting 
methodologies that could support states for a national significant cyber incident. The 
responses to the questions posed to the states produced beneficial cyber incident response 
patterns that could be implemented into planning efforts. The use of the beneficial cyber 
incident response patterns could also produce common procedures and terms. The 
recommendations in this research provide a means to better prepare the entire cyberspace 
society against the emerging threats by increasing knowledge and information flow 
regarding cyber incidents. 
Chapter I looks at this dynamic cyberspace environment, its interconnectedness, 
its multifaceted responsibilities, and the scope and scale of the challenge to secure it. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Cyberspace 
Cyberspace is defined as “a global domain consisting of the interdependent 
network of information technology infrastructures [that] includes the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
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controllers in critical industries” (United States Department of Homeland Security, Office 
of Cybersecurity and Communications [DHS-CS&C], 2011). “The globally-
interconnected digital information and communications infrastructure known as 
“cyberspace” underpins almost every facet of modern society” (White House Office of 
the Press Secretary, 2009). Cyberspace is vital to the functioning of our nation and 
national security. Furthermore, cyberspace encompasses our nation’s economy, 
commerce, public safety, personal social networks, and many more activities. 
Government agencies, industry, and the public have become dependent on it.  
Cyberspace is a dynamic and constantly changing ecosystem-like environment 
that cannot be treated as static. This environment includes many government agencies 
that provide direction and procedures to secure the nation from adversarial threats and 
vulnerabilities. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) states that the 
Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology is directed to 
“coordinate the development of a framework that includes protocols and model standards 
for information management to achieve interoperability of smart grid devices and 
systems” (Help Net Security, 2010). The Federal Communications Commission’s role in 
cybersecurity is to strengthen the protection of critical communications infrastructure, to 
assist in maintaining the reliability of networks during disasters, to aid in swift recovery 
afterwards, and to ensure that first responders have access to effective communication 
services. (Federal Communications Commission [FCC], 2010). The cybersecurity 
mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is to stop those behind the most 
serious computer intrusions and the spread of malicious code. On the FBI’s public site 
this mission area is attributed to the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, signed by 
the president in 2003 (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2010). The Department of 
Defense (DOD) has the U.S. Cyber Command, a subordinate unit of another DOD 
organization called U.S. Strategic Command. This command will direct the operations 
and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks and prepare to, 
when directed, conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable 
actions in all domains, ensure U.S./allied freedom of action in cyberspace, and deny the 
same to our adversaries (McMichael, 2010). Finally, Homeland Security Presidential 
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Directive 7, “Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,” states 
the following: “The [Department of Homeland Security] Secretary will continue to 
maintain an organization to serve as a focal point for the security of cyberspace. The 
organization will facilitate interactions and collaborations between and among Federal 
departments and agencies, State and local governments, the private sector, academia and 
international organizations” (United States Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 
2003). 
2. Cyberspace Threats  
The cyberspace environment is under perpetual attack. Cybersecurity threats 
against the United States are increasing. Reports of security incidents are on the rise, 
increasing over 650 percent over the past five years for federal agencies (United States 
Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011, p. 8). Our interconnected threats to the 
cyberspace environment affect the public, private, and government sectors. Cyberspace 
allows us to communicate with our mobile devices; obtain a seat for air travel; power our 
homes, offices, and factories; maintain our personal banking and national economy; and 
obtain government services. Its benefits are tremendous and undisputed. The cyberspace 
user community is facing a set of emerging cybersecurity threats that are the result of 
increasingly sophisticated and persistent methods of attack.  
President Bush launched the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative 
(CNCI) in January 2008 (National Security Council, 2008). The CNCI consisted of a 
number of initiatives to establish a secure cyberspace for the United States. Moreover, in 
February 2009, President Obama initiated an interagency cybersecurity review to develop 
a strategic framework to ensure that the CNCI was being appropriately coordinated with 
Congress and the private sector. In May of 2009, President Obama issued the Cyberspace 




Cybersecurity has been called “one of the most urgent national security problems 
facing the new administration” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008). The 
Obama administration has declared that U.S. critical information infrastructures are a 
strategic national asset.  
3. Cyberspace Incident Planning 
The DHS Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) works 
cooperatively to secure and ensure the availability of our nation’s cyber and 
telecommunications infrastructure. The Secretary of the DHS, through CS&C, is 
responsible for providing crisis management and coordination in response to significant 
cyber incidents; coordinating and integrating information from the federal cybersecurity 
centers, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and the private sector; and 
generally maintaining an organization to serve as a focal point for the security of 
cyberspace. DHS’s operational cybersecurity mission includes working with owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure to support cybersecurity preparedness through risk 
assessment, mitigation, and incident response capabilities and by securing unclassified 
networks for federal civilian departments and agencies, or what is called the “.gov 
domain” (DHS, 2011d). 
The White House Cyberspace Policy Review laid a foundation for the scope, 
reliance, and interrelatedness of our technology and communications systems, and it 
called for the development of a cybersecurity incident response plan. To address this, 
CS&C developed the National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) in accordance 
with the principals of the National Response Framework (NRF). The NCIRP describes 
how the nation responds to significant cyber incidents. (The NCIRP definition of a 
significant cyber incident is set out in Appendix A.) The NRF enables all response 
partners to prepare for and to provide a unified national response. The NCIRP defines a 
significant cyber incident and expands on the NRF to address the unique operational 
response structure. 
The NCIRP was developed through numerous collaborative federal, state, local, 
and private sector interactions. The March 2011, interim version 1.8 of the NCIRP was 
 5 
approved as an interim plan pending revision at the National Security Staff deputies’ 
committee meeting on cybersecurity on August 27, 2011. The approval process included 
incorporation of the lessons learned from Cyber Storm III. In September 2010, Cyber 
Storm III tested the NCIRP.  
Cyber Storm III is a DHS-sponsored exercise that brings together a diverse cross 
section of the nation’s cyber incident responders to plan and assess U.S. cyberresponse 
capabilities. “Securing America’s cyber infrastructure requires close coordination with 
our federal, state, international, and private sector partners,” DHS Secretary Janet 
Napolitano said in a statement in regard to the Cyber Storm III exercise (DHS, October 4, 
2010c).  
The NCIRP sets the strategic direction for how the nation responds to cyber 
incidents and how operations are escalated into a nationally coordinated response for 
significant cyber incident activities. A significant cyber incident sets the conditions in the 
cyber domain that require increased national coordination. This increase in national 
coordination is triggered when the National Cyber Risk Alert Level (NCRAL) system is 
set at severe or critical. The NCRAL has a five-level system that starts with day-to-day 
operations designated as 1) normal, 2) guarded, 3) elevated, 4) severe, and 5) critical. 
This system takes into account the threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences 
across the cyberinfrastructure and provides an indication of the overall national cyberrisk. 
Each of the levels has associated risk and expected actions, as set forth in Appendix D.  
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
President Obama has stated: “No single official oversees cybersecurity policy 
across the federal government, and no single agency has the responsibility or authority to 
match the scope and scale of the challenge” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 
2009). The federal government cannot respond alone to secure cyberspace. Rather, the 
cyberspace ecosystem environment requires a national partnership that includes our state, 
local, tribal, and territorial governments and the private sector.  
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Information and communication technologies continue to evolve in cyberspace. 
To address growing threats and vulnerabilities, the national partners must be adaptive and 
must adjust in order to respond to cyber incidents more effectively and efficiently. This 
approach should include analysis and evaluation of the use of standard methods and 
terms, standardized notification and reporting, unified resource management, and the 
integration of information flow. All of this should lead to the optimization of the cyber 
incident response through the strength of a combined effort and the lessening of 
duplicative efforts. “Given this constantly changing landscape, we must continually 
assess the effectiveness of our prevention, protection, and response efforts in cyberspace 
and adjust the NCIRP and other strategic, operational, and tactical plans accordingly” 
(DHS-CS&C, 2011). 
A cyber incident response can be a data hungry atmosphere, and an ad hoc 
approach to the issue without the use of standards and developed procedures could 
present unnecessary challenges. It can be problematic when developing courses of action 
for a cyber incident when the approach is not universally understood, accepted, and used 
by all those affected. 
The DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (QHSR) identifies the 
importance of what is referred to as the homeland security enterprise. The enterprise 
includes the federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector 
entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities who share a common national 
interest in cyberspace. The QHSR has five overarching mission areas: mission area four 
is the safeguarding and securing of cyberspace. The QHSR states, “We must invest in the 
innovative technologies, techniques, and procedures necessary to sustain a safe, secure, 
and resilient cyber environment” (DHS, 2010a). Sustaining a safe, secure, and resilient 
cyberecosystem should include documented standards and adaptive methods and 
procedures.  
CS&C engaged extensively with cyberspace partners to build the NCIRP. It will 
continue to engage with them as that program grows to meet new challenges. With the 
constantly changing landscape of cyberspace, adjustments must be made to the NCIRP 
and other plans as required.  
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The NCIRP provides autonomy to states for cyber incident response and 
stipulates that, until amended, the contact point for a significant cyber incident is the state 
homeland security advisor (HSA). The state HSA serves as counsel to the governor on 
homeland security issues and may serve as a liaison between the governor’s office, the 
state homeland security structure and the DHS. Currently the NCIRP does not have a 
documented response procedure or operational construct, risk model, or alerting and 
notification methodology that could standardize states’ support to a significant cyber 
incident beyond contacting the HSA.  
D. TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS  
1. Summary  
Significant cyber incident response solutions should include recognized, 
standardized, and documented plans and procedures for cyberspace incident constructs, 
risk models, or notification and alerting methodologies. This will enable the effective and 
repeatable transfer of intent, objectives, resource limitations, and desired outcome for a 
cyber incident. The roles and responsibilities associated with the intent, objective, and 
outcome for a cyberspace incident should be understood and documented, as well as 
allowing for preincident preparatory planning. The preparedness, response, and recovery 
of states for a cyber incident or event will be variable, both in their inherent knowledge 
and in their capabilities. The use of centers, hubs, or nodes for information distribution 
and resource management could address limited cyber incident response capabilities and 
encourage the likelihood of obtaining desired outcomes. 
2. Coordinated Alerts, Notifications, and Risk Indexing  
The NCRIP explains how a significant cyber incident is triggered by an increase 
in the risk indexing system, NCRAL. The NCRAL system enables an evaluation of risk 
to the information and communication technologies that support the nation’s security. It 
examines threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. It does not use a color-coded system 
as it moves through its index categories of day-to-day to critical. 
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Color-coded systems should be reviewed. Color-coded alerting methodologies—
such as those used by DHS—can be confusing and misunderstood if the community they 
alert is not familiar with each of the color categories or if the alert remains indefinitely at 
one color. To address potential confusion associated with color-coded alerting 
methodologies, research will review risk indexing tools like the NCRAL system to alert 
the states of a cyber incident that is not color coded. An example of the challenges 
associated with color-coded alerting methodologies is the replacement of the DHS color 
coded Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), which was initiated in 2002. In 
April 2011, the HSAS was officially replaced with the National Terrorism Advisory 
System (NTAS). The new NTAS removed the color-coded risk indexing scheme. It is 
believed the NTAS will more effectively communicate information about terrorist threats 
by providing timely detailed information about the event—and not just a change in color. 
3. Coordinated Organizations  
The use of centralized or regional centers, hubs, or nodes for incident 
coordination, information distribution, and resource management could address capability 
shortfalls. The NCIRP points to the National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center (NCCIC) for a significant cyber incident where it would coordinate 
national response efforts. The NCCIC works directly with federal, state, local, tribal, and 
territorial governments and private sector partners (DHS-CS&C, 2011). 
The NCCIC is a 24x7operational element of CS&C for the production of a 
common operating picture for cybersecurity and communications across the federal, state, 
and local government, intelligence and law enforcement communities, and the private 
sector (DHS, August 9, 2011c). When Secretary Napolitano opened the NCCIC, she 
stated, “Securing America’s cyber infrastructure requires a coordinated and flexible 
system to detect threats and communicate protective measures to our federal, state, local, 
and private sector partners and the public” and “consolidating our cyber and 
communications operations centers within the NCCIC will enhance our ability to 
effectively mitigate risks and respond to threats” (DHS, 2009b).  
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Another centralized or regional center for the notification of a significant cyber 
incident could be the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC). 
The MS-ISAC is viewed as the focal point for cyberthreat prevention, protection, 
response and recovery for the nation’s state, local, territorial, and tribal governments 
(Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center [MS-ISAC], 2011). 
The NCIRP maintains that the MS-ISAC should be seen as a key resource for 
state, local, tribal, and territorial government information sharing; early warnings and 
alerts; mitigation strategies; training; exercises; and maintenance of overall 
cybersituational awareness (DHS-CS&C, 2011). Much like the NCCIC, the MS-ISAC 
has a twenty-four-hour watch and warning cybersecurity operations center, which was 
launched with the White House cybersecurity coordinator, Howard Schmidt, present. 
From the viewpoint of the MS-ISAC, the cybersecurity operations center builds on a 
long-standing information sharing partnership between the DHS, with an expectation of 
enhancing situational awareness at the state and local levels for the NCCIC (DHS, 
2010b).  
Under the authority of Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 
2010, Title III, the catalog of federal domestic assistance states that the DHS obligated an 
estimated $3,000,000 in fiscal year 2010 to the MS-ISAC. The type of assistance is a 
cooperative agreement with the objective of supporting activities involving cybersecurity 
protections for state, tribal, and local governments (Catalog of Federal Domestic 
Assistance, 2011).  
Due to the autonomy of the states guaranteed by the Declaration of Independence 
and the disparate cyberspace capabilities and methods that the states employ, it is prudent 
to understand these and other processes as they pertains to this research before a 
significant cyber event.  
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E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Summary 
This review identified pertinent literature that provided insight and guidance to 
those standardized operational cyberspace event models that could support states in a 
significant cyber incident, as defined by the NCIRP. The literature review examined the 
value, feasibility, and merit of other event and incident alerts, emergency notification 
models, and risk assessment mythologies. 
The review analyzes common threads in other incident declarations or notification 
systems and risk models, including the cyberspace system, e.g., the Maritime Operational 
Threat Response, Amber Alert, the Emergency Alert System, the Integrated Public Alert 
and Warning System, the World Health Organization’s pandemic alert, the electricity 
sector’s physical security measures, and the cyberspace ecosystem. Analysis and 
evaluation of other similar models had common and useful factors for the thesis research 
inquiry into those standardized operational cyberspace event models that could support 
the states during a cyber event. 
2. Notifications and Alerts  
During the State of the Coast Guard address in March of 2009, the then-
Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen, spoke of a process known as the 
Maritime Operational Threat Response, or MOTR. Using the 2004 national strategy for 
maritime security as a catalyst, the MOTR has matured over the years as an interagency 
notification tool. Utilizing prearranged protocols, federal officials coordinate their efforts 
to identify and mitigate risk in the maritime domain. During his speech Admiral Allen 
said, “The MOTR process is a gold standard for interagency coordination and 
cooperation,” adding that “this is an unequivocal interagency success story” (United 
States Coast Guard, 2009). 
The MOTR notification process includes numerous federal agencies, much like 
the model that this research sought, that provide a collaborative environment to develop 
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courses of action in response to threats through their command centers and designated 
experts. The MOTR process allows the contributing agencies to supply their knowledge, 
experience, and capabilities to address the threat in the maritime domain (Kreisher, 
2009). Much like the cyberspace domain, the utilization of MOTR in the maritime 
domain requires a broad, collaborative approach to ensure that the desired outcome is 
fully discussed and fully informed by all the agencies that have a stake in that outcome.  
Policy guidelines to enhance national and homeland security in the maritime 
domain are addressed by National Security Presidential Directive 41 (NSPD-41) / 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (HSPD-13). A key element of the nation’s 
maritime security policy is the national strategy for maritime security, which defines the 
maritime domain as a system that—much like cyberspace—touches many areas of 
federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and 
international organizations (White House, 2005, p. 1). 
The MOTR provides a coordinated response to threats against the United States 
and its interests in the maritime domain. The network of integrated agencies utilized 
during the MOTR provides a platform for national-level interactions for a coordinated, 
unified, timely, and effective information flow, in support of MOTR execution (United 
States Joint Forces Command, 2011). Furthermore the DHS is the lead MOTR agency, 
thus providing another potential link to its viability to state models for cyber incidents. 
Review of the MOTR notification methodology was beneficial to the research and 
evaluation for models applicable to state methods for cyber incidents. 
Evaluation of existing matured and seasoned alert systems and processes was 
helpful for the research as well. One alert system that has proven itself numerous times is 
the Amber Alert. Amber Alerts use technology to disseminate information about child 
abductions in a timely manner (Library of Congress, 2009, p. 1). The Amber Alert uses 
an existing system called the Emergency Alert System (EAS). EAS sends emergency 
messages with the cooperation of broadcast radio and television and most cable television 
stations. Its most common use is for weather alerts (Library of Congress, 2009, p. 2). The 
Amber Alert leverages existing systems—an important aspect of this research due to the 
varying degree of capabilities of the states as they address cyber incidents. Understanding 
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how other alert models utilize existing systems was invaluable in the research of 
standardized operational cyberspace event models. Amber Alert plans are partnerships 
that include law enforcement agencies, highway departments, and communication 
companies that provide emergency alerts (Library of Congress, 2009, p. 1). A state’s 
response and recovery for a significant cyber incident is also a partnered and 
collaborative event. Review of the Amber Alert process demonstrated a successful and 
currently deployed alert system to benchmark and learn from. 
Another alert and notification system that gave instructive guidance was the EAS, 
mentioned above. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) jointly 
administers the EAS with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in 
cooperation with the National Weather Service (NWS), an organization within the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The EAS is built on a 
structure conceived in the 1950s but now refurbished with new technologies to bring the 
system up to twenty-first-century standards (Library of Congress, 2010). As part of the 
refurbishments, FEMA is developing the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System 
(IPAWS) to meet requirements for the new alert system. IPAWS was specified by an 
executive order (EO) issued by President George W. Bush in 2006 (Library of Congress, 
2010, p. 8). This analysis gives helpful data on a few fronts: 1) It is a collaborated 
national alert system; 2) it is meeting new demands established by current technologies; 
and 3) it is an example of a national endeavor as specified by the EO. A significant cyber 
incident that involves the states needs to be grounded in all three of these areas. Although 
IPAWS is embracing new technologies and is a national endeavor, the IPAWS program 
has fallen behind schedule. The Government Accountability Office attributed the lack of 
progress mainly to “shifting program goals, lack of continuity in planning, staff turnover, 
and poorly organized program information from which to make management decisions” 
(Library of Congress, 2010, p. 1). Ensuring a timely and effective state response for a 
significant cyber incident will require determined and executable planning; it must also 
take into account staff turnover due to political cycles; and it must have obtainable goals 
and outcomes. 
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Research regarding recent events led to informative data. In the last few years, 
H1N1 pandemic planning and preparedness was a the focus of a national and 
international declaration. The World Health Organization (WHO) provided a declaration 
as guidance about pandemic alert levels to the national and international community 
(University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 2009). The WHO pandemic alert phases were 
initially outlined in its 2005 global influenza preparedness plan, but in April 2009 the 
WHO revised its pandemic plan and alert scale to reflect advances that had occurred 
since 2005. These advances included increases in the understanding of past pandemics 
and strengthened outbreak communications. Defining cybersecurity response based on 
the real or perceived vulnerabilities of cyberspace is currently very dynamic. The WHO 
transitional posture with the emerging expanse of the pandemic threat was also very 
dynamic. The fast-paced and daily emerging dynamic environment of the WHO 
guidance, which positioned the national and international communities for a prepared 
response, was beneficial for this research. 
Review of specific examples was important, but observed or empirical data 
research was important as well. Alert analysis and situational awareness have become 
very important as information and communication technologies become increasingly 
widespread to emergency responders (International Community on Information Systems, 
2010, p. 1). This paper investigated trends and patterns embedded in alert notifications 
generated over a given period of time in order to uncover correlations that may exist in 
the data. Study data was mined from the National Center for Crisis and Continuity 
Coordination (International Community on Information Systems, 2010, p. 2). This 
empirical data revealed that correlations in state responses to significant cyber incidents 
should be reviewed in order to understand common methods and terms, standard 
notification and reporting processes, unification of resource management, and the 
integration of information. The National Center study took place over a two-year period, 
with only one source of collection, which could constitute a bias in the data. A greater 
number of data collection points could resolve this weak point in their methodology and 
provide the necessary conclusive correlations and paths to consider. This research looked 
at the broadcast of large numbers of alerts that may impair the ability of analysts to 
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adequately make informed decisions in a timely fashion. A timely response with well-
informed decision-making capability is a universal necessity for any declarations, alerts, 
and emergency notifications. 
3. Risk Indexing  
DHS has eighteen critical resource key infrastructure (CRKI) categories. Some of 
these categories utilize risk indexing mythologies. One of those, the electricity sector, 
uses physical security measures to be considered for a defined threat alert level. The 
North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) uses a five-level color-coded 
system, in which level 1 is green (low); 2 blue (guarded); 3 yellow (elevated); 4 orange 
(high); and 5 red (severe). There are basic standards and procedures for a given level 
(North American Electric Reliability Council [NERC], 2002a, p. 3). As in the case of the 
Department of Homeland Security’s homeland security threat advisories, which were 
replaced by the NTAS as discussed earlier, color coding can be misleading or confusing 
if the responder is not intimately aware of the definitions of each color. This is a 
consideration that could nullify any benefits that a simple color-coding approach could 
provide. Although a quantifiable element is helpful as levels are increased or decreased, 
consideration was based on how to convey a complex transition in a simple manner. 
Moreover, this report helped define the scope for measures that each organization can 
implement for its specific alert level response plans. Risk planning is a fundamental and 
critical area for declarations, alerts, and emergency notifications, regardless of type.  
The electricity sector provided further guidance in the specific area of 
cyberresponse. This guide also gives examples of security measures to be considered on a 
given cyberthreat level, i.e., 1 green (low); 2 blue (guarded); 3 yellow (elevated); 4 
orange (high); and 5 red (severe) (NERC, 2002b, p. 3). The fact that both NERC 
documents use the same color-code and naming conventions exposes a possible 
weakness. Models with like quantifiers can be problematic. Both a response guideline for 
an alert level and an accompanying definition is provided, which would be a prudent 
approach for a standardized operational cyberspace event model as well (NERC, 2002b, 
p. 2). The guidance is not an exhaustive list of possible security measures but its review 
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and analysis lead to more in-depth cyber response literature. Furthermore, this literature 
points out the fact that not all measures are applicable to all organizations—a reference to 
the unique capabilities found in each state. 
Another area of risk mythology reviewed was threat-risk indexing. A threat-risk 
index can provide a quantitative variant or basis for either prioritizing security upgrades 
or updating the qualitative national color-coded threat alert (Idaho National Engineering 
and Environmental Laboratory, 2004). Although other risk-based approaches were 
considered, this particular report examined a quantitative approach employing scientific 
and engineering concepts to develop a threat-risk index for decision makers to utilize. 
Risk methodologies can provide delineations for courses of actions for all phases of a 
cyber event, i.e., preparedness, detection, analysis, response, and resolution of the event 
or incident. 
During this research it was observed that many risk-based methodologies 
resemble or appear to be iteratively derived from W. Edwards Deming’s continuous 
process feedback loop. In the 1950s, Deming proposed that a business process should be 
analyzed and measured to identify sources of variation that cause products to deviate 
from customer requirements. This cycle is commonly known as the PDCA cycle (or plan, 
do, check, act). The PDCA cycle feedback loop dictated the need to assess and measure 
effectiveness, which would be used as feedback for possible improvements.  
Much like the PDCA cycle, the DHS National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP) proposes a continuous feedback loop with its risk management framework (DHS, 
2009a, p. 27). Both give process flow considerations that provide insight into procedure 
paths as to their relevance to a standardized operational cyberspace event model for a 
state cyber event.  
4. Cyberspace Environment 
During a speech made by DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano at the University of 
California Berkeley College of Engineering, she stated that cyberspace security requires a 
full range of partners and that DHS is currently building a technical ecosystem based on a 
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concept of cyberspace as a distributed space (DHS, 2011b). During the Berkeley speech, 
Napolitano deliberately used the term “ecosystem” to indicate that cyberspace is a 
dynamic, even organic environment that cannot be treated as self-contained. In the 
cyberspace security industry, partners have depicted this environment as an ecosystem. 
This evaluation gives credence to the necessity to recognize that the cyberspace 
environment operates much like a cyberspace ecosystem (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2011). 
With its numerous interconnections and interdependencies among diverse stakeholders, 
networks, applications, systems, and computing devices, the health of one component can 
and frequently does impact the health of the ecosystem itself. It was important to 
comprehend this diversity of cyberspace its manifestation as an ecosystem that will 
require organizations to gather, filter, integrate, analyze, and comprehend vast amounts of 
information for a response.  
F. METHODOLOGY  
1. Method 
Qualitative analysis of semistructured survey data, along with an extensive review 
collected from 19 states, was used to better understand how standardized operational 
cyberspace events are being defined and what risk models and alerting models are being 
used by the states. What common cyber events, risk models and alert protocols appear 
among states, and which of the aforementioned could support the states during a 
significant cyber incident as defined by the NCIRP?  
2. Sample 
Formal documented questions that pertained to cyber incident response were 
formulated and sent to state chief information officers, state chief information security 
officers, state homeland security officers, and other individuals who would be central to 
this mission area. The answers were returned and compiled for their relevance to this 
research. State chief information officers and state chief information security officers are 
on the front end of the cybersecurity dialogue, lending expertise to the identification of 
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gaps in policy and testing strategies for remediation in order to address threats in the 
states’ evolving cybersecurity environment (Williams, 2009). 
Technical and academic literature from the private and public sectors was 
reviewed. A common thread was found in documentation, technical and academic 
literature event models, and incident declarations or notification systems. Analysis and 
evaluation of other similar models had common and useful factors for this thesis research. 
The review included communities that utilize event and incident declarations, alerts and 
emergency notifications, and risk assessment mythologies. Moreover, empirical data 
research was important. 
Other existing models were evaluated and applied where appropriate, e.g., the 
Emergency Alert System, which sends emergency messages with the cooperation of 
broadcast radio and television; the National Cyber Risk Alert Level system, which 
triggers national coordination for a significant cyber event; the North American Electric 
Reliability Council, which uses a five-level color-coded system; and pandemic alert level 
declarations to the national and international community by the World Health 
Organization. 
A combination of states, some with a robust security posture some to with a lesser 
position, assisted in the development of an operational model for a significant cyber 
incident. Also important to the research was an understanding of key state contact points, 
interconnectivities, and resources, e.g., the state CIO, the state chief ISO, MS-ISAC; 
Communications ISAC; Information Technology ISAC; NCCIC, the National Operation 
Center (NOC); and the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC). 
These organizations were useful to the research for the following reasons: The 
MS-ISAC is a collaborative state and local government–focused cybersecurity entity that 
addresses cyberthreat prevention, protection, and response and recovery throughout the 
states of our nation. The NCCIC combines two of DHS’s operational organizations: the 
National Coordinating Center (NCC) for Telecommunications and the United States 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). The NCC is the operational arm of 
the National Communications System. It provides a mechanism to coordinate the 
 18 
initiation and restoration of national security and emergency preparedness 
telecommunication services in times of crisis. It is a joint industry- and government-
staffed center to handle emergency telecommunication requests. The US-CERT’s mission 
includes analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability reduction, mitigation, and 
aid to national recovery efforts for critical infrastructure information systems. The NOC 
serves as the primary national-level hub for domestic situational awareness, common 
operating picture, information fusion, information sharing, communications, and 
operations coordination pertaining to the prevention of terrorist attacks and domestic 
incident management. Finally, the NICC serves as the DHS Office of Infrastructure 
Protection’s focal point for coordination with the eighteen national critical infrastructure 
and key resources sectors during steady-state operations and during incident management 
activities. 
3. Data Collection  
In order to formulate a standardized operational cyberspace event, risk model, or 
alerting methodology, written questions were posed to the states in addition to phone and 
in-person interviews to obtain original data. Formal documented questions were 
formulated that had their bases in NCIRP, internal and external CS&C interactions and 
protocol, and personal experience. Initially my Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
colleagues at the state and local level were asked to introduce the researcher via e-mail to 
state points of contact who support the cyberspace mission area, i.e., the state chief 
information officer, the state chief information security officer, the state homeland 
security officer, and other individuals who would be key state players.  
A total of 31 states were contacted through these introductions to cyberspace 
incident response points-of-contact by NPS colleagues, other cyberspace incident 
response points-of-contact through the state contacts, state interactions at Cyber Storm 
III, public Internet searches, and cold calls. Most initial contacts were made through e-
mail over a five-month period. I received 19 responses. Six of the states did not respond 
to my inquiry, five were not able to answer the questions for various reasons, and one 
state thought the communication was a phishing e-mail and answered with the 
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notification that “this person has attempted to contact me multiple times but I have 
chosen to ignore his request due to the nature of the questions he has asked.”  
All interaction with the states was personalized, i.e., e-mails were addressed to 
that state and the cyberspace point-of-contact (POC); the questions included that 
particular state’s POC and their state flag. The following is indicative of the email 
message sent: 
I would like to ask if you or your staff would participate in my research 
study entitled “State Methods for a Cyber Incident” on a voluntary and 
confidential base. This research is an academic thesis study for my Master 
of Arts in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense) for the 
Naval Post Graduate School. I have 10 questions I would like to provide to 
you to get input from the State of Delaware as it relates to cyber events. I 
believe this research could help shape a cyber response at the State and 
Federal level.  
I appreciate any assistance that you could provide with these questions. In 
addition if you could e-introduce me to your colleagues in other States that 
would be extremely helpful.  
Please contact me at this email or the phone numbers below with any 
questions. 
Once the POC responded, I sent the following e-mail message with the questions 
attached: 
Please find the questions in the attached. For planning proposes I will need 
to set a date of 28 April 11 when I hope you can provide your answers. If 
this does not meet your schedule please let me know a better date for you. 
Due to research data integrity please don’t send this form or the questions 
beyond the State Government Offices you represent. 
I appreciate any assistance that you could provide with these questions. In 
addition if you could e-introduce me to your colleagues in other States that 
would be extremely helpful. 
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4. Data Analysis  
In seeking to better understand state standardized operational cyberspace events, 
19 states were analyzed by survey question rather than by state. The research evaluated 
possible commonalities, identified variance among them, and reviewed the models being 
used by the states. The data analysis process was performed as follows: 1) Each survey 
was coded, looking for particular phrases that describe particular state practices, 
processes, and/or status; 2) all practices, processes, and/or status were grouped by 
research questions using a table format. Once key phrases were organized by research  
 
question, the researcher used open and axial coding to assist in locating commonalities 
and patterns in the data, while at the same time taking note of the level of variance among 
the states. 
As discussed previously, a total of 31 states were contacted over a five-month 
period. Of those 31 contacted, 19 (61 percent) responded. Initially, there were 10 original 
questions, but 13 questions were posed to the states. Questions 3a, 3b, and 3c were added 
after some of the state responses were received, due to knowledge gleaned from the input 
of the states. A total of 227 answers were received.  
The following questions were given to the states. The questions were asked with 
the anticipation that the states would have a basic knowledge of the NCIRP and its 









Table 1.   Questions Given to the States 
Count Question 
1 How does your State define a State Cyber Incident? 
2 Who is the key State individual that would be contacted for a State Cyber Incident? 
3 What Office/Department/Section does that key State individual work for that would be contacted for State Cyber Incident?  
3a How are reports gathered for a State Cyber Incident? 
3b Is there a requirement that State Cyber Incident be reported? 
3c What level of involvement was your State engaged, with the coordination of the development of the DHS National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP)? 
4 How does your State define a National Significant Cyber Incident? 
5 Who is the key State individual that would be contacted for a National Significant Cyber Incident? 
6 What Office/Department/Section does that key State individual work for that would be contacted for National Significant Cyber Incident? 
7 What alerting methodologies or procedures do your State use for a Cyber Incident notification? 
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What is a predominant cause of a State Cyber Incident? 
• Insider—Person motivated by revenge, greed, conducts malicious or 
hostile activities in cyberspace. 
• Hacktivist—Utilizes technology to announce a social, ideological, 
religious, or political message. 
• Cyber Criminal—Uses malware and exploits to steal goods, money, 
identities, or passwords. 
• Individual Hacker—Breaks into cyberspace and networks motivated by 
the challenge to prove their skills, brag to friends, and are thrilled to 
engage in unauthorized activities. 
• Industrial and Technology Espionage—Collection of science, 
intellectual property, or technology information that could provide 
economic or strategic benefits. 
• Terrorism—Connecting—Propaganda, fund raising, 
recruitment/radicalization. 
• Terrorism—Cultivating—Operational and planning communications, 
funds transferred, training in cyberspace. 





How does your State currently respond to a State Cyber Incident? 
• State has an operation center that would be used for a State cyber event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 
• DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) utilized? 
• Other—Explain. 
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How would your State respond to a National Significant Cyber Incident? 
• State has an operation center that would be used for a National cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 




The following are general observations from each of the questions posed to the 
states. A complete listing of all the questions asked of the states and their responses is 
found in Appendixes B. Detailed patterns and interpretations of the research data are 
found in the next chapter.  
A. QUESTION 1: DEFINITION OF STATE CYBER INCIDENT 
Question 1 was posed as “How does your state define a state cyber incident?” 
State responses included terms like “activity,” “incident,” and “event,” indicating 
a change in recognized day-to-day operations to an accelerated operational stance. In 
addition, the data showed that some states opted to define a state cyber event with concise 
statements that included phrases showing the detection of a known threat or vulnerability, 
e.g., “infection or unauthorized access;” “exposure of sensitive information;” 
“unexplained network or system behavior;” “a breach of the data confidentiality;” and 
“compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data and information 
technology resources.” Furthermore, various states answered the question by directing the 
researcher to state-recognized and established security policies, standards, and 
procedures.  
One of the states made a distinction between a “cyber incident” and an 
“information security incident,” making the point by stating that an information security 
incident can also involve paper or people, not just technology. 
Lastly, one state embraced a federal agency definition found in the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Information Security Glossary of Key Information Security Terms. This particular state 
also built much of its plans, policies, and procedures on other NIST documents, e.g., the 
Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (United States Department of Commerce, 
2008).  
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B. QUESTION 2: KEY CONTACT FOR STATE CYBER INCIDENT 
Question 2 asked, “Who is the key state individual that would be contacted for a 
state cyber incident?” 
Historically, certain organizations have been established that have recognize the 
significance of state CIOs, including the National Association of State Chief Information 
Officers (NASCIO), an association that represents state chief information officers and 
information technology executives and managers from the states, territories, and the 
District of Columbia. States have also seen the necessity of integrating cybersecurity into 
overall state infrastructure planning. “The state-level CISO stands in the middle of these 
large and complex issues, serving as the partner of the CIO in ensuring the protection of 
state data and systems” (IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2010).  
In most instances, the answers to Question 2 showed that the state CISO is the key 
state individual contacted for a state cyber incident. One of the other titles of those 
contacted was a variation of the state CISO, i.e., information security and privacy officer. 
Two of the states used an incident response team, and the teams operate within the 
construct of the offices of the CIO or CISO.  
C. QUESTION 3: KEY DEPARTMENT FOR STATE CYBER INCIDENT 
Question 3 asked, “What office/department/section does that key state individual 
work for that would be contacted for state cyber incident? 
Many of the states use offices with “security,” “technology,” “information,” or 
“enterprise” in the title. The predominate word, as expected, is “security.” Three of the 
states house the offices within their department of administration. One of the states has 
linked its information security with its privacy office.  
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D. QUESTION 3A: REPORT GATHERING FOR STATE CYBER INCIDENT 
Question 3A was posed as: “How are reports gathered for a state cyber incident?” 
One state relies on analog methods, i.e., verbal reports. Secure web tools, 
customizable tracking and log applications that employ recognized incident reporting 
forms, ticketing reporting systems, help desks and hotlines, are included in the methods 
that the states utilize.  
E. QUESTION 3B: REPORTING REQUIREMENT FOR STATE CYBER 
INCIDENT 
Question 3B asked, “Is there a requirement that state cyber incidents be 
reported?” 
The States that responded to this question said that they did have a requirement to 
report a state cyber incident; in some cases that requirement is legislated by the state. One 
state noted that the state executive branch is required to report but that some of the 
institutes—for example higher education—are not. One state noted that it can take 
systems offline if deemed necessary.  
F. QUESTION 3C: INVOLVEMENT WITH NCIRP 
Question 3C inquired, “What level of involvement was your state engaged with 
the coordination of the development of the DHS National Cyber Incident Response Plan 
(NCIRP)?” 
Review of the responses showed that the states had varying degree of 
involvement, from “none at all,” “not sure,” “minimal,” and “not directly, but through 
MS-ISAC and the National Association of State Chief Information Officers Security and 
Privacy work group.”  
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G. QUESTION 4: STATE DEFINITION OF NATIONAL CYBER INCIDENT 
Question 4 asked, “How does your state define a national significant cyber 
incident?” 
Many states responded that they did not have a definition or would not be the 
entity to define that. One state acknowledged the complexity of making such a 
determination, but those that did provide a brief answer agreed that the incident would be 
one that exceeded state capabilities or overwhelmed state government and industry, i.e., it 
affected multiple states or regions or impacted critical infrastructure, national process, or 
economy. Lastly, one state used the definition inherent in the NCIRP, i.e., when the 
NCRAL system is set at “severe” or “critical.”  
H. QUESTION 5: KEY CONTACT FOR NATIONAL CYBER INCIDENT 
Question 5 queried, “Who is the key state individual that would be contacted for a 
national significant cyber incident?” 
The answers to this question were similar to the contacts given in response to 
Question 1 regarding a state cyber incident. One underlying theme in this answer was an 
elevated leadership notification all the way to senior officials in the state, e.g., the 
governor or the governor’s homeland security advisor. One state stipulated that it would 
contact the state infrastructure protection center, which is supported 24 hours a day. The 
infrastructure protection center would also coordinate with the network operation center, 
the security operation center, and the privacy office. Having a 24-hour operational 
element within the state’s own funding and management control indicates a strong 
commitment to the cyberspace mission area.  
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I. QUESTION 6: KEY  DEPARTMENT FOR NATIONAL CYBER 
INCIDENT 
Question 6 asked, “What office/department/section does that key state individual 
work for that would be contacted for a national significant cyber incident?” 
The answers to this question were similar to given in response to Question 3, 
concerning a state incident.  
J. QUESTION 7: STATE CYBER INCIDENT ALERTING 
METHODOLOGIES  
Question 7 inquired, “What alerting methodologies or procedures does your state 
use for a cyber incident notification?” 
This question was one of the fundamental questions presented to the state. It was 
formulated with the expectation of eliciting responses with direct implications for the 
research question.  
E-mails, text messages, emergency and alert notification systems, web-based 
tools, and formalized and published incident plans were recognized as methods.  
K. QUESTION 8: PREDOMINANT CAUSE OF STATE CYBER INCIDENT 
Question 8 asked, “What is a predominant cause of a state cyber incident?” 
The predominant cause of a state cyber incident, according to the greater numbers 
and the content of the states’ answers, was “cyber criminals.” Additional information for 
this cause included the qualifying language that the perpetrator “uses malware and 
exploits to steal goods, money, identities, or passwords.” The next most predominant 
cause given was “individual hacker,” with the qualifying definition that the perpetrator 
“breaks into cyberspace and networks motivated by the challenge to prove their skills, 
brag to friends, and are thrilled to engage in unauthorized activities.”  
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L. QUESTION 9: CURRENT RESPONSE TO STATE CYBER INCIDENT 
Question 9 asked, “How does your state currently respond to a state cyber 
incident?” 
The predominant answer to this question was the utilization of the state operation 
center. A principal information-sharing and analysis center brought into play was the 
Multi-State (MS-ISAC).  
M. QUESTION 10: STATE RESPONSE TO NATIONAL CYBER INCIDENT 
Question 10 was posed as “How would your state respond to a national significant 
cyber incident?” 
The answers to this question were similar to given to Question 9, i.e., responding 
to a state cyber incident is viewed as very similar to responding to a national significant 
cyber incident.  
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III. FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
The following describes the detailed patterns and the interpretations of the 
answers provided by the states for each survey question. Due to the sensitivity of the data 
the state will only be referenced with an identifier key. As can be ascertained from 
Appendix B, State Response to Questions, some states submitted their policy and 
standards or the state web page where similar data could be found. The approach will 
focus on the explicit answers given, rather than an extensive review of the state’s policy 
and standards. At the end of each question, key patterns and interpretations will be 
provided. A summary of all the patterns and interpretations of the answers provided by 
the states for each survey question is provided at the end of this section.  
It is recommended that future research consider a comparative analysis of state 
cyber policy and standards as they relate to the overall security mission area that resides 
in cyberspace and that impacts an extremely diverse community of users and their wide 
range of needs. Furthermore, the analysis of state cyber policy and standards could add to 
the operational cyberspace event, risk models, or alerting methodologies found in this 
research for a significant cyber incident.  
A. QUESTION 1: DEFINITION OF STATE CYBER INCIDENT 
1. Findings 
The state definition of a state cyber incident presented a diverse spectrum of 
understanding, approaches, and terms. In a national-level event or a large incident that 
encompasses multiple states, a common understanding by varied groups, agencies, or 
departments regarding how to plan for, respond to, or recover from the event can be very 
important in a time-dependant situation. Furthermore, common approaches and terms is 




Using recognized and established definitions—as in the case of State N-14’s use of the 
NIST Information Security Glossary of Key Information Security Terms and State E-5’s 
use of the NIST Computer Security Incident Handling Guide—shows the willingness of 
states to utilize federal plans, policies, and procedures.  
As discussed in Appendix A, the NCIRP definition denotes that a significant 
cyber incident is likely to cause, or is causing, harm to critical functions and services 
across the public and private sectors by impairing the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of electronic information, information systems, services, or networks. The use 
of “confidentiality, integrity, or availability” is also seen in other federal documents 
(United States Department of Commerce, 2008, p. 5-1). States F-6, H-8, I-9, J-10, N-14, 
O-15, and S-19 all used some form of this language or explicitly stated the terms 
“confidentiality, integrity, or availability.” Universally recognized terms like these for the 
federal, state, local, and industry cyberspace community could be established—which at a 
foundational level gives a common starting point. Differences in cyberspace security 
terms can be small or subtle, as in the areas of approach to the subject, the methodologies 
used, and the areas of concentration, but ultimately the differences can have hugely 
differing responses. 
State P-16 made a distinction between a “cyber incident” and an “information 
security incident,” making the point that an information security incident can also involve 
paper or people, not just technology. The NCIRP definition of a significant cyber incident 
expands upon and includes the destroying, degrading, or disrupting of the cyber 
infrastructure and/or the integrity of the information that supports the private and public 
sectors. This “supporting” comment could be inferred to encompass paper or people, but 
explicit language is important in the technical, distributed, and diverging needs found in 
the cyberspace ecosystem.  
Lastly, State P-16 rank-ordered areas because major risks to the state include the 
financial impact of a personal identifiable information (PII) breach and subsequent 
impact to state reputation. This state prioritizes incidents that result in an intentional or 
accidental PII breach.  
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2. Key Patterns and Interpretations 
a. Common Terms 
The use of universally recognized and established definitions and terms 
for the federal, state, local, and industry cyberspace community could be beneficial to the 
response to cyber incidents. The use of a common approach is not foreign to incident 
management. An incident-management system known as the Incident Command System1 
(ISC), which has its roots in wildfire management, has established itself as a foundational 
tool in creating a cohesive incident response. For example, this system was used during 
the response to the 9/11 terrorist attack at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia.  
b. Risk-Based Methods  
A risk-based approach to an incident can provide a systematic, aggregated, 
and rigorous analysis methodology. Risk-based ranking for complex systems can be a 
methodology that allows both those providing the data and those using the data to make 
operational and strategic paths toward judgments clearer, due to its indexing or 
hierarchical methods. Risk and its management can allow the identification, analysis, and 
communication of the incident risk.2 This can permit decisions to be made to accept, 
avoid, transfer, or control the cyber incident to an acceptable level, considering the 
associated costs and benefits of any actions taken.  
                                                 
1 The Incident Command System (ICS) is a recognized and standardized on-scene incident 
management approach that enables a coordinated response among various jurisdictions and functional 
agencies, using common terminology, processes, and organizational structure.  
2 DHS Risk Lexicon defines “risk” as the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an 
incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences.  
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B. QUESTION 2: KEY CONTACT FOR STATE CYBER INCIDENT 
1. Findings 
Key to the answers from this question is the desire to have the responsibility for a 
state cyber incident reside with the chief information security officer. The states (B-2, C-
3, E-5, H-8, I-9, K-11, L-12, M-13, Q-17, R-18, and S-19) saw this, as a unique type of 
incident that necessitated an individual designated to address it.  
States N-14 and P-16 used incident response teams, but the teams operated within 
the construct of the offices of the CIO or CISO. An approach that would utilize well-
trained and accessible teams of subject matter experts does provide a cadre of quick 
response personnel, but funding a 24-hour operation could be costly and could necessitate 
an on-call rotation status. State N-14 uses an on-call approach along with the title of 
incident commander for the leader of their incident response team. As with any on-call or 
24-hour personnel, it is important to establish documented expectations and guidelines in 
the area of pay, overtime, and estimated length of hours for response and recovery.  
2. Key Patterns and Interpretations 
a. Progression of Responsibility for Coordination and Control 
For any incident, it is important to establish who is in charge, e.g., the 
chief information officer or the chief information security officer. ICS uses the position 
and naming convention of incident commander for the individual.3 Inasmuch as ICS is a 
practice that has consistently shown a desired result, it is not a practice that should be 
overlooked for other areas of analogous connections.  
                                                 
3 The incident commander is the incident command system organizational element responsible for 
overall management of the incident. 
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b. Specialized Teams 
A specialized team like an incident response team could be deployed by 
the individual in charge and used on an as-needed basis. Law enforcement uses special 
weapons and tactics teams (SWAT) for exceptional situations that require increased 
firepower or specialized tactics. One of the divisions in CS&C is the National Cyber 
Security Division (NCSD). The DHS Control Systems Security Program (CSSP), 
operated under the NCSD, manages and operates the Industrial Control Systems Cyber 
Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) in coordination with the US-CERT. ICS-CERT 
is a specialized incident-response that which provides focused operational capabilities for 
the defense of control system environments against emerging cyber threats by responding 
to and analyzing control systems–related incidents.  
C. QUESTION 3: KEY DEPARTMENT FOR STATE CYBER INCIDENT 
1. Findings 
State H-8 noted that the responsible office was the Office of Information Security, 
housed within the Governor and Cabinet Agency. According to State H-8, this 
responsibility for state cyber incidents was established by state law. This level of senior 
leadership could accelerate decision making for cyber events. This should come with the 
operational caveat that senior leaders cannot possibly be the subject matter expert for all 
scenarios and generally must rely on the team around them to make those decisions based 
on information from their subject matter experts.  
Having roles and responsibilities defined and established by statute can be an 
important step in cybersecurity plans, policies, and procedures and be a compelling 
reason to comply. At the federal level, many reports have been written directed to the 
very issue of defining roles and responsibilities for cybersecurity (United States 
Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2010a; GAO, 2010b).  
State D-4 has linked its offices and individuals to be contacted for state cyber 
incidents with its privacy office. Only State D-4 responded in this manner. Privacy issues 
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are in the forefront in many cyberspace dialogues. The E-Government Act of 2002 
recognized that the availability of information, from personal information to public 
information, has important ramifications for the protection of personal information 
contained in government records and systems. The E-Government Act mandates an 
assessment of the privacy impact of any substantially revised or new information 
technology system. The document that results from these mandated assessments is called 
a privacy impact assessment (PIA). Like State D-4, the federal government recognizes 
the importance of privacy and of linking the state cyber office directly with the privacy 
office. This combination of linking offices and individuals to be contacted for state cyber 
incidents with their privacy office could ensure the protection of personal and public 
information through real and perceived scrutiny.  
Finally, if a state cyber incident is confined within its own geographic borders, it 
could be less important to not put an emphasis on common titles. A cyber incident—
whether on a national, state, or local scale—is frequently not confined by borders. This 
factor of crossing borders is not unique to a cyber incident of any scale. Common titles 
could be beneficial to expedite cyber incident response and recovery, whether within or 
outside the state’s borders.  
2. Key Patterns and Interpretations 
a. Cyber Legislation  
Many times government laws need to be passed not only to establish 
particular statutes but to allow the process of law making to take place. The diverse 
cyberspace community and its interconnected and interdependent ecosystem requires 
many critical voices to be heard. These many voices require a process, and the making of 
law can lend itself to that process and institute it for use and updates.  
b. Roles and Responsibilities 
Cyber incident management, like any management process, requires 
defined roles and responsibilities. Cyber legislation can support the defining process and 
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again bring to the table those who have a vested interest in the cyberspace mission space. 
As roles and responsibilities are being worked for senior leadership, it is important to 
build collaborative information sharing and flow processes simultaneously with the 
defining of the roles and responsibilities of the operational staff. Moreover, in the 
defining process a firm understanding is needed of all the players important to the 
security of cyberspace; this could include the privacy office, public affairs, acquisition, 
and apportions.  
D. QUESTION 3A: REPORT GATHERING FOR STATE CYBER INCIDENT 
1. Findings 
Question 3a was added to the list of questions after some states had already 
responded to the original questions; therefore 12 of the total 19 states provided answers to 
3a. The new questions were introduced after the original 10 questions due to input from 
subject matter experts at the Naval Postgraduate School and interactions with state 
CISOs.  
States C-3 and P-16 use analog verbal reports that include regular updates and an 
initial report by telephone respectively. State L-12 does not have a formalized process, its 
approach being ad hoc. It is reassuring in pre- and post-incident management to have a 
person to talk to, but with the type of information, which could include video and data, 
and the volume that our nation’s response groups have become accustomed to, relying on 
verbal reports alone could be problematic. The same reasoning applies to an ad hoc 
approach. Without standard procedures in an information- and data-hungry incident 
response atmosphere, an ad hoc approach could present unnecessary challenges.  
State D-4 uses a secure incident management web portal; State E-5 uses an open 
online customizable application; State Q-17 uses a state portal; and State R-18 uses an 
online report form. States M-13 and O-15 are in the process of creating an Internet-based 
reporting tool or portal. State F-6 utilizes an incident-management help desk, and State J-
10 uses a ticketing reporting system.  
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2. Key Patterns and Interpretations 
Incident Management Support Tools: Secure username and password-protected 
portals or web-based tools that allow customizable tracking and log applications that 
employ recognized incident reporting forms, ticketing reporting systems, help desks and 
hotlines are all expedient methods in a time of crisis. Allowing access to these tools 
through Internet user name– and password-protected sites gives accessibility via any 
online connection or hot spot.4 Some beneficial attributes of incident-management web 
tools are web conferencing; 24X7 availability; document and form libraries; geographical 
visualization; and a common operational picture. DHS utilizes the Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN), which is a national secure and trusted web-based portal for 
information sharing and collaboration.  
E. QUESTION 3B: REPORTING REQUIREMENT FOR STATE CYBER 
INCIDENT 
1. Findings 
Question 3b was added to the list of questions after some states had already 
responded to the original questions; therefore 12 of the total 19 states provided answers to 
Question 3b. 
All 12 states indicated that they did have a requirement to report a state cyber 
incident. States D-4, E-5, F-6, P-16, and R-18 all stated that they are mandated by 
legislation to report a state cyber incident. State O-15 stated that a recently passed law 
requires it.  
As noted above, having legislated roles, responsibilities—and in this case 
notifications—defined and established can be a compelling reason to comply. On 
May 12, 2011, the White House introduced notification legislation (Executive Office of 
                                                 
4 A hotspot is a site that offers Internet access over a wireless local area network through the use of a 
router connected to a link to an Internet service provider. Hotspots may be found in coffee shops and 
various other public establishments. 
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the President, 2011a). The legislation discusses Federal and State responsibilities for 
customer notification requirements for certain business entities (Executive Office of the 
President, 2011b). 
State R-18 noted that the state executive branch is required to report but that 
higher education institutes are not required. This could pose challenges to managing a 
state cyber incident if all organizations do not follow the same reporting requirements.  
State E-5 noted that it can take systems offline if deemed necessary. At the federal 
level, this one fact, the Internet on-off switch, has become very polarizing and is a very 
contentious area for any legislated cyberspace policy.  
2. Key Patterns and Interpretations 
a. Standardized Notification and Reporting  
In developing courses of action for a cyber incident, it can be very 
problematic when the notification and reporting process is not universally accepted and 
used by all those affected. 
b. Authority to Disconnect 
The ability to disconnect noncompliant agencies from statewide networks 
due to a cyber incident that is impairing the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
that network is a compelling method for addressing threats and vulnerabilities. 
Disconnecting networks is a means to isolating systems. Disconnecting networks is a 
measure that should be well understood, and any cascading or indistinct associations 
should be well thought through before networks are disconnected. The management of 
the media and the information to be conveyed to the public are also aspects of the 
situation that should be brought to bear in this discussion as well.  
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F. QUESTION 3C: INVOLVEMENT WITH NCIRP 
1. Findings 
Question 3c was the last of those added to the list of questions after some states 
had already responded to the original questions; therefore, 15 of the total 19 states 
provided answers to Question 3c.  
National-level documents, which include multistakeholders and diverse 
requirements from each community, can be very challenging to create, collaborate, and 
vet for universal acceptance. The NCIRP was no exception. With an understanding of the 
magnitude of the cyberspace mission and its security, DHS CS&C developed the NCIRP 
through numerous collaborative federal, state, local, and private-sector interactions. 
Based on NCIRP collaboration meeting documents, seven states were involved with its 
development. Those seven states were either not provided with research questions or 
were not able to participate.  
A review of the answers showed that states had varying degrees of involvement. 
States B-2, E-5, M-13, and P-16 stated that they had no involvement. State H-8 said that 
it had minimal involvement and indicated that it would have been more involved if given 
the opportunity. State A-1 said that it saw its involvement in the DHS Cyber Storm III 
through the MS-ISAC, where the NCIRP was exercised, as involvement in the NCIRP 
development. State A-1 said that it did not have the funding to participate directly in the 
Cyber Storm III exercise through its representatives. Additionally, State A-1 stated that it 
had participated in a statewide cybersecurity tabletop exercise sponsored by its 
emergency management agency, which had been produced under the advice of DHS and 
FEMA. The purpose of the cybersecurity tabletop exercise was to provide participants 
with an opportunity to evaluate current concepts, plans, and capabilities for a response to 
a cyberattack against the state’s computer networks and systems. The exercise was 
modeled after the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). 
Multiple local, state, and government entities were involved in the exercise, which 
included border state representatives.  
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A means to stay involved with the potential of leveraging other insights and lower 
expenses can be realized through established organizations like the NASCIO. State Q-17 
provided input to the NCIRP through the NASCIO Security and Privacy work group 
forum.  
Finally, State I-9 recognized the challenges in its own organization: the state was 
given the opportunity to review for comments, but the document sat on the desk of 
another state department, which prevented others from having enough time to comment.  
As stated above, national policies can be very challenging to create, collaborate, 
and vet for concurrence. The president has recognized that no single official oversees 
cybersecurity policy across the federal government and no single agency has the 
responsibility (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2009).  
The NCIRP, like other policies, requires stakeholders with vested interests to be 
involved with development and updates. DHS should continue its collaborative 
development of the NCIRP with the states and others that have vested interests in the 
response to a national significant cyber incident.  
2. Key Patterns and Interpretations 
a. Exercise for Proficiency  
Exercises provide opportunities for departments and agencies to 
demonstrate competencies and strengths and to incorporate them in order to sustain and 
enhance their existing capabilities. Furthermore, exercises provide an objective 
assessment and evaluation of gaps and shortfalls in plans, policies, and procedures so that 
areas for improvement can be addressed prior to local or national cyber incidents. 
Exercises help to clarify roles and responsibilities among different entities and to improve 
combined interagency capability and interoperability.  
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b. Leverage Existing Organizations  
Many capable and proven organizations exist that allow departments, 
agencies, the private sector, academia, professionals, and individuals to contribute their 
subject matter expertise and to glean information from other subject matter experts. A 
few of these organizations are the Anti-Virus Information Exchange Network (AVIEN); 
Applied Computer Security Associates (ACSE); the Forum of Incident Response and 
Security Teams (FIRST); the Government Forum of Incident Response and Security 
Teams (GFIRST); the International Association for Computer Systems Security, Inc. 
(IACSS); the Meridian Conference; the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center (MS-ISAC); the National Association of State Chief Information Officers 
(NASCIO); the National Coalition for the Prevention of Economic Crime (NCPEC); the 
National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization (NESCO); the National Security 
Institute; the National White Collar Crime Center; the System Administration, Audit, 
Network, Security (SANS) Institute; and US-CERT.  
G. QUESTION 4: STATE DEFINITION OF NATIONAL CYBER INCIDENT 
1. Findings 
States C-4, E-5, M-13, O-15, P-16, and R-18 responded that they did not have a 
definition for a national significant cyber incident. The significant cyber incident term 
can be difficult to define: the basis of its significance may be subjective and based on the 
specific cyber mission space, e.g., finance, water, electricity, agriculture. A report 
conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies captured 84 significant 
cyber incidents from 2006 to 2011, based on a monetary threshold for distinguishing a 
significant cyber incident (Lewis, 2011). The report focused on successful attacks on 
government agencies and defense and high-tech companies or economic crimes with 
losses of more than one million dollars. This is a method that can delineate and provide 
thresholds for response to a significant cyber incident. Another method to identify a 
significant cyber incident could look at the threat perpetrator or the outcome of the 
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action, e.g., insider,,hacktivist, cyber criminal, individual hacker, accident, terrorist or 
denial of service, phishing, virus, trojan. Regardless of methodology, defining a 
significant cyber incident will provide a common element and understanding for 
response.  
The NCIRP utilizes a risk-based approach that sets conditions in cyberspace; it 
requires increased national coordination for a significant cyber incident. This increase in 
national coordination is triggered when the NCRAL is set at “severe” or “critical.”  
The NCRAL system takes into account the threats, vulnerabilities, and potential 
consequences across the cyber infrastructure. It is determined through the NCCIC and its 
partner organizations, which aggregate risk-based management activities to inform 
national-level risk and suggest appropriate national- and sector-level prevention and 
protection activities. State H-8 used the definition found in the NCIRP utilizing NCRAL 
risk indexing. Similarly States D-4, I-9, and Q-17 used a risk-indexing system. State I-9 
used a color coded risk-indexing system. As mentioned above, DHS recognized 
challenges associated with color-coded alerting methodologies and replaced the HSAS 
with the non-color-coded NTAS.  
State B-2 acknowledged the complexity of making such a determination, unless 
the event is a large-scale incident affecting interconnections with the federal government. 
Furthermore, State B-2 stated that improvements in information sharing between the 
various states and the federal government are required to determine such an occurrence; it 
is nearly impossible to do so on a day-by-day basis, considering daily threats, without 
improvements.  
The National Response Framework identifies increasing conditions where a 
state’s capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded (DHS, 2008, p. 22). These 
conditions are requisite steps for a state to request federal assistance, including if 
appropriate, a Stafford Act presidential declaration of an emergency or major disaster. 
Like the NRF’s identification of increased conditions as a delineator, States F-6, G-7, J-
10, K-11, L-12, and S-19 viewed a national significant cyber incident as an elevation of 
threats and vulnerabilities where larger geographic boundaries were involved and impacts 
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to critical infrastructure, national procedure, or economy would be part of the cyber 
incident. State K-11 used the explicit language that it would include large-scale cyber 
incidents that overwhelm the government and the private sector. 
2. Key Patterns and Interpretations 
Thresholds for a Course of Action: A threshold can give a recognized and 
documented change of state or boundary where different courses of action can be 
predefined. Establishing a fulcrum or tipping point where boundaries are crossed—such 
as large-scale incidents that affect interconnects with the federal government, larger 
geographic areas, impacts to critical infrastructure, or ones that overwhelm state and 
private-sector resources—could provide varying allocations and predefined desired 
outcomes.  
H. QUESTION 5: KEY CONTACT FOR NATIONAL CYBER INCIDENT 
1. Findings 
States B-2 and K-11 said that, depending on the scale, an elevated senior official 
notification would happen that would include the governor and the governor’s homeland 
security advisor respectively. As stated above, senior leaders should be made aware of 
the incident, but this should be done concurrently with those who can provide good 
information to the leaders, thus allowing a well-informed decision to be made by the 
senior leadership.  
State D-4 stipulated that the key state individual who would be contacted for a 
national significant cyber incident would be the state’s Infrastructure Protection Center, 
which is supported on a 24-hour basis. The state’s Infrastructure Protection Center would 
coordinate the information with the state Network Operation Center and the statewide 
Information Security and Privacy Office. The approach of State D-4 appears to be 
comprehensive and provides information to many of the stakeholders involved. Similarly, 
State G-7 follows a systematic approach with the Department of Technology and 
Information, the chief security officer, the Department of Safety and Homeland Security, 
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the state Emergency Management Agency, and the state police high-tech crimes unit. It 
can be a fine line between informing the right stakeholders, those who can impact the 
outcome, and having to inform those who are just hungry for data. In a national 
significant cyber incident or any incident that has the potential for a broad information-
hungry environment, this can be challenging task and one that needs to be managed as 
well. Moreover a 24-hour operational element used day to day, pre-incident, incident, 
post-incident, and back to day to day require different funding and management than one 
that is not. For a 24-hour operation, the staff size must accommodate a rotation of 
personnel, potential overtime hours, and possibly legal ramifications associated with 
federal, state, or union personnel laws.  
Finally, States G-7 and R-18 included their departments of emergency 
management. Historically these departments are the incident management organizations 
that are at the forefront of any incident and traditionally approach the event using the 
ISC. The ISC has many years of being successfully utilized in physical geographic 
events. Cyber incident planning and responding can be a shift from traditional incident 
management like ICS. Cyber incidents could produce physical events, but their 
management most likely will happen virtually and independent of a geographic location. 
Moreover, the perpetrator of the event might be in another state or outside the borders of 
the United States.  
2. Key Patterns and Interpretations 
Regional Hubs: Utilizing a shared or common capability by region or at the 
national level for national significant cyber incidents could be a potential means to reduce 
resources and personnel cost. Collaborated plans, polices, and procedures would be 
required for a regional or national hub or node approach to allow effective and efficient 
information flow and action. A regional approach is not foreign to the federal 
government. The DHS Federal Emergency Management Agency is organized with 10 
regional offices and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection of DHS has 20 regional 
field operations offices in the United States. As another example of a regional approach, 
the U.S. Army has chosen in its 2011 Posture Statement to include a regional approach, 
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called regional hub nodes. These focused force multiplier hubs provide satellite, voice, 
and data services to support forces as they flow into a theater of operations, including 
domestic disaster relief, and they enable deployed units to connect to Department of 
Defense networks.  
I. QUESTION 6: KEY DEPARTMENT FOR NATIONAL CYBER 
INCIDENT 
1. Findings 
The answers to this question reveal a strong similarity to those organizations 
contacted for a state cyber incident discussed above in Question 3. States C-3, F-6, J-10, 
L-12, M-13, N-14, O-15, P-16, and R-18 all provided the same answer for this question 
and Question 3 above. This indicates that nine of the 19, or 47 percent, of the states from 
which the author received responses reported that the key department contacted does not 
change for a national significant cyber incident and a state cyber incident.  
State B-2 elevated the notification to senior official organization as compared to 
those organizations contacted for State Cyber Incident. Similarly State G-7 elevated their 
contact organizations to senior levels and added the Chief Security Officer, Department 
of Safety and Homeland Security, State Emergency Management Agency and State 
Police High Tech Crimes Unit as compared to a State Cyber Incident. State K-11 added 
State Law Enforcement to the organizations like G-7.  
Expanding the organizations for a National Significant Cyber Incident from a 
State Cyber Incident could introduce time drains as responders shift from one type 
incident to the other, so resource management should be considered.  
2. Key Patterns and Interpretations 
Unity of Effort: Having one organization for all cyber incidents could be of 
benefit with regard to timeliness of response and well-developed relationships and 
processes before a national cyber incident. Courses of action can require a cooperative 
approach involving numerous stakeholders. This can produce an effective and efficient 
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use of resources, but it requires mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and 
consequences of actions. Unity of effort can also identify the ways in which capabilities 
best complement each other. 
J. QUESTION 7: STATE CYBER INCIDENT ALERTING 
METHODOLOGIES 
1. Findings 
State B-2 addressed this question by identifying it use of formalized and 
published incident plans and an interagency state, federal, and private-industry incident 
response team as its alerting method procedure for cyber incident notification. With an 
official and published plan and procedure, a state can test and exercise the plan and 
implement lessons learned or alerting procedure refinements iteratively.  
States C-3, F-6, G-7, H-8, J-10, and L-12 specified the use of e-mail as a method, 
but these states did not all rely exclusively on e-mail. State C-3 used text, phone, and an 
emergency notification system in addition to e-mail. State F-6 used the telephone and 
help desk escalation procedures. State G-7 also specified the telephone and added to e-
mail subscription services and reverse 9-1-1.5 State G-7’s subscription service is 
available to the public and allows individuals access to various types of notifications. In 
addition to e-mail, State H-8 also includes two types of web-based portals: 1) an internal 
alerting tool that includes key state players, e.g., information security managers, the 
Department of Law Enforcement, the Division of Emergency Management, and 
enterprise information technology; and 2) the secure MS-ISAC portal. State J-10 also 
uses the MS-ISAC portal. State L-12 adds the telephone to its e-mail alert methods. 
Backup systems and methods give alternative avenues in the case of a system that 
becomes unavailable or disabled. Relying on telephone and e-mail alone could be a 
 
                                                 
5 Reverse 9-1-1 is a commercially available public-safety communications system used by public-
safety organizations and emergency managers to communicate with groups of people in a defined 
geographic area by sending prerecorded messages automatically by phone. The system uses a database of 
telephone numbers and associated addresses and can be tied into geographic information systems. 
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limiting factor to a cyber incident notification. Regardless of the number of backups, it 
can be important to test and exercise any process during down times or normal operation 
tempo as a preparatory position.  
State D-4 described a systematic approach that includes plans, policy, and 
procedures. In State D-4, the state network operation center notifies the agencies’ 
information security officers and privacy officers. In addition, the state infrastructure 
protection center communicates internal and external alerts. For compliance state 
agencies adhere to the statewide privacy policy. State D-4 addresses continuing 
compliance through an annual statewide policy and standards compliance assessment 
process that implements remediation or mitigation plans to correct gaps. Finally State D-
4 uses its authority to disconnect noncompliant agencies from the statewide network.  
State P-16 maintains a list of agency incident POCs that includes e-mail 
addresses, telephone, and cell phone numbers. For incidents with potential public 
exposure, State P-16 leverages the state communications office to manage press 
notifications; for incidents with law enforcement ramifications, the state works with the 
state police or leverages contacts in the FBI cyber crimes unit. Call lists or POC lists can 
be time consuming to maintain. During the research, some key state chief information 
officer positions underwent change; maintaining current contact lists could be 
problematic without the direct support of the departments and agencies responsible for 
the updates. Maintenance could be accomplished through a shared user name– and 
password-protected site where the updates could be made by each department, agency, or 
industry partner; this could alleviate the sometimes tedious task for one individual of 
tracking down the updated numbers.  
State S-19 responded that for a catastrophic incident, in which the emergency 
operations center became engaged or activated, it would use WebEOC.6 
                                                 
6 WebEOC is a commercially available product. It is a web-enabled crisis information management 
system that provides secure information sharing. 
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2. Key Patterns and Interpretations 
Authorized and Published Plans, Policies, and Procedures: Authorized and 
published plans, policies, and procedures and their implementation enable the strategic or 
tactical transfer of intent, objectives, limitations, and desired outcomes for a cyber 
incident to the decision makers, givers of information, receivers of information, and those 
who take action on that information.  
K. QUESTION 8: PREDOMINANT CAUSE OF STATE CYBER INCIDENT 
1. Findings 
States B-2, C-3, D-4, E-5, F-6, G-7, H-8, I-9, J-10, K-11, L-12, M-13, N-14, O-
15, P-16, Q-17, and R-18, that is 17 of the 19 states, or 89 percent, stated that the 
predominant cause of a state cyber incident is cyber criminals. A 2011 cyber crime study 
independently conducted by Ponemon Institute and sponsored by ArcSight found that 
cyber attacks have become common occurrences and that the median annualized cost of 
cyber crime for 50 organizations in the study was $5.9 million per year. The companies 
in the study experienced 72 successful attacks per week and more than one successful 
attack per company per week (Ponemon Institute, 2011). It could be argued that numbers 
derived from companies that might have a vested interest in their resolution could be 
suspect, but the states’ answers bring validity to the data, as does its independent study 
approach. Furthermore, regardless of how the numbers were derived, it is not uncommon 
to hear weekly national news outlets give headline stories about cyber criminal activities; 
to argue that this is not a substantial threat risks an unprepared position.  
The next predominant cause identified was that of individual hacker. States D-4, 
F-6, G-7, H-8, I-9, J-10, K-11, N-14, P-16, and Q-17, that is 10 of the 19 states, or 53 
percent, stated that this was a predominant cause of state cyber incidents. These hackers 
want to prove their skills and want to engage in unauthorized activities. This type of 
cause can be a nuisance, but it is important to recognize the threat in order to defend 
against it.  
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The next cause based on the numbers was that of insider. States E-5, F-6, G-7, I-9, 
J-10, O-15, and Q-17, that is 7 of the 19 states, or 37 percent, stated that this was a 
predominant cause of state cyber incidents. This cause could be an officemate motivated 
by revenge or greed.  
Next in line was the hacktivist. States F-6, H-8, J-10, K-11, and Q-17, that is 5 of 
the 19 states, or 26 percent, stated that this was a predominant cause of state cyber 
incidents. The hacktivist could be motivated by political, religious, environmental, or 
other personal beliefs. His goal might be just to embarrass his opponents or deface their 
Web sites.  
Two states saw “industrial and technology espionage and terrorism—exploiting” 
as a predominant cause of state cyber incidents. Of the 19 states that responded, other 
noteworthy but infrequent reponses included “terrorism.” With the dynamic and open 
nature of cyberspace, it is naive not to consider all possibilities in planning.  
Finally the category of “other” brought to light areas that should be considered. 
State D-4 commented that careless, nonmalicious, overworked, and unaware employees 
or vendors who did not follow processes, procedures, or quality assurance measures and 
out-of-date contract terms and conditions were causing approximately 70 percent of their 
potential incidents. State S-19 also pointed to human error or users unaware of the impact 
of their actions.  
State P-16 brought up another key area that was not part of the causes presented 
in the questions: that of loss or theft of physical information security assets, such as 
laptops or paper.  
Lastly, State N-14 observed that power outages and natural disasters are a cause 
of state cyber incidents. A power outage could either cause a state cyber incident, or it 
could be the outcome of a state cyber incident.  
2. Key Patterns and Interpretations 
Comprehensive and Adaptive Methods: Cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities 
cover a large spectrum and can be adaptive; therefore, the methods to address them 
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require a comprehensive and adaptive approach. Unintentional human error, persistent 
actors who want to exploit the systems for intellectual, political, monetary, or personal 
gain, and nation states who want to do harm in the physical realm of power outages and 
natural disasters are all part of the cyberspace ecosystem and its security.  
L. QUESTION 9: CURRENT RESPONSE TO STATE CYBER INCIDENT 
1. Findings 
States B-2, C-3, D-4, E-5, F-6, G-7, H-8, I-9, J-10, K-11, M-13, N-14, P-16, R-18, 
and S-19, that is 15 of the 19 states, or 79 percent, stated that they currently respond to a 
state cyber incident utilizing a state operation center. The responses of States C-3 and P-
16 indicated that they do not have a state operation center but would use their state 
information system incident response team much like a center. State K-11 answered that 
it uses a formal ICS-type process that is activated—which they viewed as a state 
operation center. The types of state operation centers used were as follows: B-2 state 
security staff security operation center; D-4 state infrastructure protection center; E-5 
information security operations center; F-6 department of information technology 
operations center; G-7 nothing specific; H-8 emergency operations center (EOC) and 
state network operation center; I-9 homeland security EOC; J-10 state security operation 
center; M-13 state operation center. State N-14 was not explicate but indicated that it has 
a designated and a backup site. State R-18 uses the state EOC or operates out of the 
information technologies agency; and S-19 uses the state EOC.  
The following states indicated that they would use the state fusion center: D-4; F-
6; G-7; H-8; J-10; K-11; O-15; and R-18. This equates to 8 of the 19 states, or 42 percent, 
who stated that they currently respond to a state cyber incident utilizing a state fusion 
center.  
The principal information sharing and analysis center brought into play was the 
Multi-State (MS-ISAC). Every state that gave a response interacts with the MS-ISAC in 
some form. The various interactions included State B-2, with a comment that it was 
statically aligned with them; State C-3 saying that it would notify them; State F-6 adding 
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that this is how it would apply information sharing and collaboration with U.S. states and 
territories; and State I-9 stating that this is the organization upon which it depends the 
most and where it gets expert help. The Communication ISAC and the Information 
Technology ISAC were not given as entities utilized for response. Tapping and 
leveraging into defined and established capabilities can be an effective way to reduce 
costs and resource expenditures.  
Lastly, although not completely absent, the DHS NCCIC and the DHS National 
Operation Center7 (NOC) was not shown to be a go-to capability.  
2. Key Patterns and Interpretations 
Leverage Existing Capabilities: For a significant cyber incident the DHS NCCIC 
coordinates national response efforts. This 24/7 operational element of CS&C works 
directly with the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and private-sector 
cyber incident partners. The cyber ecosystem requires a coordinated and flexible system 
to detect threats and to communicate protective measures to the community it represents.  
The state fusion center should be used to the fullest extent possible and could be 
used as capability force multiplier to share information and provide situational awareness 
to a larger community. State fusion centers can have information sharing technologies not 
always readily available to state centers and should be leveraged when feasible. The DHS 
NICC is a capability dedicated to protecting critical infrastructure essential to the nation’s 
security, health and safety, and economic vitality, and it should be considered as well.  
                                                 
7 The DHS NOC provides real-time situational awareness and monitoring of the homeland, 
coordinates incidents and response activities, and in conjunction with the DHS Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis, issues advisories and bulletins concerning threats to homeland security, as well as specific 
protective measures. The NOC coordinates information sharing to help deter, detect, and prevent terrorist 
acts and to manage domestic incidents. 
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M. QUESTION 10: STATE RESPONSE TO NATIONAL CYBER INCIDENT 
1. Findings 
States C-3, D-4, E-5, F-6, G-7, H-8, I-9, J-10, K-11, M-13, N-14, P-16, R-18, and 
S-19, that is 14 of the 19 states, or 74 percent, stated that they currently respond to a 
national significant cyber incident utilizing a state operation center. The state operation 
centers were similar to those in Question 9 above but were was evaluated to more senior 
levels for a national significant cyber incident in only a few instances. The types of state 
operation centers used were as follows (those shown are only those with a different 
response from the one given for a state cyber incident): C-2 state EOC; D-4 state 
infrastructure protection center and the Department of Emergency Management and 
Military Agency EOC; G-7 Unified Command8 at the state EOC. State S-19 discussed 
the use of the Catastrophic Cyber Disruption Plan (CDP) for communications and to 
guide response efforts in its response. The CDP provides emergency management and 
information technology entities in State S-19 with a communications, planning, and 
response framework to facilitate emergency management coordination within the state in 
the event of a catastrophic cyber-related disruption. The CDP is a subset of a regional 
plan that could expand or contract based on the magnitude of the effects.  
The use of the state fusion centers was also similar to those answers provided for 
Question 9 above with the following notable exception: State F-6 would activate its cyber 
incident response plan, which will be discussed in the Chapter IV.  
Finally States F-6, G-7, K-11, and O-15 all pointed out that for a national 
significant cyber incident, they would interact with the DHS NCCIC.  
 
                                                 
8 Unified Command applies to the Incident Command System involving multiple jurisdictions or 
agencies. The Unified Command intent is to enable institutions and agencies with different legal, 
geographic, and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact. 
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2. Key Patterns and Interpretations 
Cyberspace Specific Planning: Explicit cyberspace planning, coordination, and 
execution among those who have a vested interest should include the full gamut of 
incident management that includes prevention, protection, response, and recovery. Using 
existing physical event plans without addressing any uniqueness associated with a 
geographic unencumbered virtual cyberspace event in that plan does not completely deal 
with all requirements. Utilizing existing plans as a starting point and allowing cyberspace 
nuances to be applied could render a solid position and a full gamut of incident 
management.  
The research question posed was to establish a standardized operational 
cyberspace event, risk models, or alerting methodologies that could support states for a 
significant cyber incident, as defined by the NCIRP. Through the analysis and review of 
the answers provided by the states and the key patterns and interpretations above, 
methodologies that could support states for a significant cyber incident were analyzed, 
evaluated, and displayed. The key patterns and interpretations are summarized in their 
totality in below.  
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Table 2.   Summary of Patterns and Interpretations of State Responses 
• Key Patterns and Interpretations 
• Use universally recognized and established definitions and terms for the federal, 
state, local, and industry cyberspace community.  
• Employ a risk-based approach to cyber incident planning that gives a systematic 
and rigorous analysis methodology including remediation based on workflows 
and procedures. 
• Leverage current or proven incident management systems, methodologies, or 
capabilities and alter if needed to adapt to the cyberspace mission space. 
• Help desk that allows the escalation of individuals or organizations being 
contacted 
• Statewide 24/7 incident hotline 
• Statewide 24/7 incident reporting 
• User name password-protected incident management Web portal 
• Ticketing reporting systems 
• Predefined and documented relationship with stakeholders 
• Predefined and automated notification and alerting system 
• MS-ISAC reporting process 
• Fusion centers 
• Open-source management tools 
• Online customer cyber incident reporting process 
• Web site with timestamp 
• Understand, establish, and document the progression of responsibilities for 
cyber incident coordination and control 
• Use cyber incident exercises to demonstrate competencies, strengths, and 
proficiencies and incorporate them to sustain and enhance existing capabilities 
• Establish thresholds, fulcrums, or tipping points when predefined boundaries 
are crossed, instigating varying courses of action 
• Understand a cooperative approach involving numerous stakeholders and the 
benefits of a unified cyber incident response effort 
• Use comprehensive and adaptive cybersecurity methods that address the 
adaptive threat and vulnerability spectrum 
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• Use assessment, analysis, and authorities established to disconnect 
noncompliant agencies from statewide network.  
• Authorize, develop, and document cyber incident–specific plans, policies, and 
procedures 
• Consider predefined roles, responsibilities, privacy, and legal ramifications 
• Institutionalize an annual statewide policy/standards compliance assessment 
process 
• “Central Operation Center” communicates internal and external alerts to 
stakeholders  
• Continued evaluation and review of existing alerts  




• Assess, analyze, and use specialized incident response team 
• Assess, analyze, and use regional cyber incident response and recovery 
relationships, including documented plans, policies, and procedures as 
appropriate  
• Utilize federal grant process for cyber plans and procedures 
• Maintain list of agency cyber incident federal, state, and local points of contact 
• Legislate cyber policy and procedures 
• Detail state cyber planners and subject matter experts to federal agencies and 
departments and detail federal cyber planners and subject matter experts to state 
agencies and departments 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
This research explored operational response constructs, risk models, and alerting 
methodologies that could support states for a significant cyber incident. The survey data 
collected from 19 states showed benefits in combining efforts that would be found in a 
regional approach and a need for cyber incident–specific planning. The regional approach 
allows the potential for sharing resources and knowledge. Specific planning that pertains 
to cyber incidents can give the response communities standard terms, definitions, and 
procedures. The literature reviewed showed the MOTR connected vested communities 
through teleconferencing. Through teleconferencing the MOTR collaborated situational 
awareness and actions. Recommendations will focus on cyber incident–specific planning, 
a regional hub construct, and the utilization of a federally facilitated significant cyber 
incident teleconference.  
The need for improvement in information sharing between the various states and 
the federal government was revealed in the survey data. Specific cyber incident plans, a 
regional approach, and a facilitated significant cyber incident teleconference would 
support that. Furthermore, utilizing a shared or common 24/7 operation center and 
leveraging defined, funded, and established capabilities also revealed in the data would 
be addressed with specific cyber incident plans, a regional approach, and a facilitated 
significant cyber incident teleconference.  
A regional-hub approach provides value for resource management, common 
plans, risk models, and notification alerting methods. The hub approach can provide 
shared funds execution and increased efficient and effective information flow and action 
due to the shared nature of the method. The hub could include boundary states, urban 
area security initiative sites, other key sites, and industry in those states. Regional hubs 
could facilitate hierarchal plans that could expand or contract based on the magnitude of 
the effects, where the local city plan would feed into the state plan and the state plan into 
the regional plan. The development, coordination, and execution of plans that focus on 
cyber incidents could benefit when done through a regional-hub construct as well. 
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The MOTR operational construct, configured for the cyber response community, 
could address improvements in information sharing between the various states and the 
federal government. The MOTR teleconference process utilizes a prearranged set of rules 
where federal officials coordinate their efforts to identify and mitigate risk. The MOTR 
notification process includes numerous agencies, designated experts, and command 
centers, as would be found in a regional approach. The MOTR provides a collaborative 
environment to develop courses of action in response to threats, as would be needed in a 
cyber incident. The MOTR process allows the contributing agencies to supply their 
subject matter expertise and capabilities to address the threat. Like the cyberspace 
domain, it requires a broad, collaborative approach to ensure that the desired outcome is 
fully discussed and fully informed by all the agencies with a stake in that outcome. A 
DHS-facilitated teleconference for a cyber incident could support a MOTR-like 
conference call among the state, industry, and the federal government.  
The development of cyber incident plans has been augmented through the DHS 
grant program utilizing the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP), 
which is administered by the FEMA grant programs directorate. When conditions were 
met, cyber activities have been funded under the DHS grant programs for state entities. It 
should be noted this method for cyber incident plan development requires that all 
documents and compliance conditions be met prior to any consideration.  
The recommendation described above could be used as illustrated with the 
following: 1) cyber regional hubs established throughout the nation; 2) specific cyber 
incident hierarchal plans coordinated, developed, and executed that expand or contract 
based on the magnitude of the effects in the cyber regional hub construct; and 3) DHS 
CS&C-facilitated and maintained significant cyber incident teleconferencing for 
situational awareness, discussion, or courses of action with prearranged protocols where 
cyberspace federal, state, local, and industry stakeholders can coordinate their efforts to 
identify and mitigate risk in the cyberspace domain. 
This research and its recommendations can provide the beginning components of 
a standard operating procedure (SOP) that would include the use of common terms and 
definitions, an acceptance of roles and responsibilities, regional constructs and their 
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interactions, teleconferencing procedures, training and exercise, and cyber plan 
development. For the purposes of this research, an SOP would be a written guideline that 
explains how an organization intends to operate and what is required of personnel in 
performing this operation for a given mission area, e.g., a cyberspace incident, and distills 
the important concepts, techniques, and requirements.  
The SOP would need adaptive requirements and funding avenues developed with 
the cyber response community it would support. Those requirements would include the 
roles and responsibilities for the routine or day-to-day operations, as well as the high 
operational type. The responsibilities would discuss and determine the progression of 
coordination and control for the cyber incident. The requirements would also include the 
development of the cyber incident regional construct, which would review, leverage, and 
integrate valid existing procedures and protocols, organizations, and capabilities. With 
the regional construct defined, the cyber-specific planning would be documented, where 
thresholds for courses of actions, teleconferencing procedures, member requirements, 
training, and exercise would be ascertained.  
The cyber-specific planning cannot just focus on the routine operations. It will 
require that the phases be defined when the need to elevate a cyber incident is evident. 
These would encompass the alert and notifications process and its trigger, response and 
recovery operations, and the deactivation as it progresses and swings back to routine 
operations. Finally an adaptable cyber incident approach must consider changes in the 
tactics of an adversary, the management of multiple cyber events, the security of the 
communications, expert, or surge capacity, and information management and its 
coordination.  
This research revealed that the CISO is a key individual contacted for state cyber 
incidents, a requirement that state cyber incidents be reported, and the predominate cause 
of a state cyber incident as a cyber criminal. Furthermore, the research recognized that 
states use their authorities to disconnect noncompliant agencies from statewide networks. 




extremely contentious. Disconnecting noncompliant agencies from statewide networks is 
not a one-for-one equivalent to turning the public networks off, but it does have the same 
effect, that is, that the systems are disconnected from the users.  
This research found that the use of personal contacts resulted in the most effective 
way to build the needed relationships and trust, which resulted in the questions answered. 
A response from a state that thought it was receiving questions of questionable intent 
would have been much different if the state knew who it was dealing with. The persistent 
research of finding an individual who knew me and then reaching out after that fact was 
the best means to finally make contact. 
The findings of this cyber incident research led to the recommendations above 
through analysis of the approximately 227 answers from the questions developed, 
followed by telephone and in-person interviews. This process exposed the need for 
common terms and definitions, roles and responsibilities, standardized notification and 
reporting, adaptive methods, authorized and published plans, policies, and procedures, 
and the benefits of regional constructs.  
This research does not exhaust the need for future research, due to the autonomy 
and unique relationships of the states with the federal government and the dynamic 
mission area of cybersecurity. Due to the limitation of time, some research was omitted. 
One area of future research is to conduct a comparative analysis of state cyber policy and 
standards as they relate to the overall security mission area that resides in cyberspace and 
that impacts an extremely diverse community of users with a wide range of needs. The 
significance of this research has applicability to the literature as it formulates and creates 
new data and information for the cyberspace ecosystem and its stakeholders, and it offers 
that same community and homeland security practitioners processes that could be 
replicated to respond and recover from a significant cyber event.  
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Cybersecurity is a serious challenge, and the Department of Homeland Security is 
continually making strides in improving the capabilities of the national homeland security 
enterprise and the manner in which cyberspace is represented in it. We must continue our 
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APPENDIX A.  NCIRP DEFINITION OF A SIGNIFICANT CYBER 
INCIDENT 
A Severe or Critical incident on the Cyber Risk Alert Level System. A Significant 
Cyber Incident is likely to cause, or is causing, harm to critical functions and services 
across the public and private sectors by impairing the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of electronic information, information systems, services, or networks; and/or 
threaten public health or safety, undermine public confidence, have a negative effect on 
the national economy, or diminish the security posture of the Nation.  
A Significant Cyber Incident may destroy, degrade, or disrupt the cyber 
infrastructure and/or the integrity of the information that supports the private and public 
sectors. Complications from a Significant Cyber Incident may threaten public health or 
safety, undermine public confidence, have a debilitating effect on the national economy, 
or diminish the security posture of the Nation. A Significant Cyber Incident may 
adversely affect the Nation’s ability to project force and may have implications on the 
Nation’s Strategic Deterrence capability. Rapid identification, information exchange, 
investigation, response, and remediation often can mitigate the damage that a Significant 
Cyber Incident can cause and aid in rapid recovery and reconstitution after and during an 
incident. 
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APPENDIX B.  STATE RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS  
The following is the data received by all states for each of the survey questions. 
Due to the sensitivity of the data, the state is referenced only with an identifier key.  
Table 3.   Answers to Question 1 
State Key Question 1. How does your State define a State Cyber Incident?  
A-1 
Please review the links and gather the appropriate responses to the state-level 
questions as defined from the policies at our state Web site.  
B-2 
Any activity whereby infection or unauthorized access occurs to the state’s 
electronic information or telecommunication systems or facilities that house 
said systems or electronic information. 
C-3 
An incident that impacts a number of organizations, an incident that exposes 
sensitive information that can lead to identity theft or other types of theft. 
D-4 
See privacy policy and associated exhibits/standards below for details at our 
state Web site. 
P900 - Information Security Incident Management Policy  
E901 - Exhibit Data Classification Matrix 
E902 - Exhibit Executive Checklist  
E903 - Exhibit Glossary  
S905 - Incident Submission and Response Standard 
S910 - Data Breach Notification Standard 
E-5 
Our state characterizes information system security or cyber incidents as any 
event violating the state’s security policy, standards, procedures, guidelines, 
processes or security best practice that may be detected as unexplained network 
or system behavior resulting in the loss of sensitive data or any instance where 
the state’s reputation might suffer. 
F-6 
Any event(s) which breaches the confidentiality of data, or the unauthorized 
alteration of data, or the denial of availability of data/systems, unauthorized 
access, etc. 
G-7 
A violation or imminent threat against our state’s assets. Source: Cyber Security 
Incident Response Team Policy. 
H-8 
A confirmed computer security event is a computer security incident. A 
computer security incident is any action or activity—accidental or deliberate—
that compromises the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the state’s data 
and information technology resources. 
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I-9 
Any adverse event that threatens the confidentiality, integrity or accessibility of 
an agency’s information resources. These events include, but are not limited to, 
the following: 
 
Attempts (either failed or successful) to gain unauthorized access to a system or 
its data. 
Disruption or denial of service. 
Unauthorized use of a system for the transmission, processing or storage of 
data. 
Changes to system hardware, firmware or software without the agency’s 
knowledge, instruction or consent. 
Attempts to cause failures in critical infrastructure services or loss of Critical 
Supervisory and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.  
Attempts to cause failures that may cause loss of life or significant impact on 
the health or economic security of the agency and/or State. 
Probing of any nature that an agency or other authorized entity has not approved 
in advance for system security testing purposes. 
J-10 
Security incidents include, but are not limited to events compromising or 
potentially compromising the security or integrity of the state’s information 
technology resources. 
K-11 
In the state government space we consider a Cyber Incident to be one where 
data has been breached from one or more information technology resources; 
where a large number of resources have been infected or compromised or where 
a major application has been affected. 
L-12 An adverse event originating from the Internet. 
M-13 
Any violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, 
acceptable use policies, or standard computer security practices that impacts one 
or more entities of the state and/or the state’s network infrastructure. 
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N-14 
We do not have a definition for a “state cyber incident.” We have a definition 
for “incident” which is the NIST definition on page 89 of the document from 





A violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, 
acceptable use policies, or standard security practices. 
SOURCE: SP 800-61 
Incident – 
An occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of an information system or the information the system 
processes, stores, or transmits or that constitutes a violation or imminent threat 
of violation of security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies. 
SOURCE: FIPS 200; SP 800-53 
An assessed occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system; or the 
information the system processes, stores, or transmits; or that constitutes a 
violation or imminent threat of violation of security policies, security 
procedures, or acceptable use policies. 
SOURCE: CNSSI-4009 
O-15 
The Chief of the Office of Information Security shall investigate and resolve 
any breach of an information system of a state agency or elected officer that 
uses the equipment or services of the Department or an application of such an 
information system or unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that 
materially compromises the security, confidentiality or integrity of such an 
information system.  
From recent Legislature, waiting for Governor’s signature (expected). 
P-16 
We don’t define incidents as “Cyber” incidents—we define them as 
“Information Security” incidents. The distinction is that an information security 
incident can also involve paper or people, not just technology—“Cyber” 
incidents are a subset of Information Security incidents. 
By statewide policy, we define information security incidents as: “A single or a 
series of unwanted or unexpected information security events that result in 
harm, or pose a significant threat of harm to information assets, an agency, or 
third party and require non-routine preventative or corrective action.” We 
further define a state information security incident as one that potentially 
impacts multiple state agencies or which pose a significant risk to the state. 
Because one of the major risks to the state includes the financial impact of 
Personal Identifiable Information (PII) breach and subsequent impact to state 




An incident is defined as a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer 
security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard computer security 
practices. This Information Technology Bulletin (ITB) establishes standard 
policies and processes for reporting and managing cyber security incidents. 
See #7 for Information Technology Bulletin (ITB) relating to State Cyber 
Incidents. 
R-18 
Any unauthorized access or potential unauthorized access to the state’s 
electronic data.  
S-19 
A security incident is a suspected or real event that potentially threatens or 
damages state network resources, compromises the privacy, availability or 
integrity of confidential information, and impacts service delivery. Examples of 
security incidents include unauthorized probing, denial of service attacks, access 
to confidential and potentially identifying information, loss or theft of a device 
containing confidential information, alteration of data, and unauthorized 
modifications to network systems.  
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Table 4.   Answers to Question 2 
State Key 
Question 2. Who is the key State individual that would be contacted for a State 
Cyber Incident? 
A-1 
Please review the links and gather the appropriate responses to the State level 
questions as defined from the policies at our State web site. 
B-2 
The State Security Office would be contacted and depending on the scale either 
the state incident response commander or the Chief Security Officer (CSO). 
C-3 State Chief Information Security Officer. 
D-4 
By statue/executive orders all agencies are to have a designated Information 
Security and Privacy Officers that are trained to communicate (via a secure web 
Management portal, hardcopy and/or phone) all potential incidents to the State 
Infrastructure Protection Center, for monitoring/management/escalation by the 
Statewide Information Security and Privacy Office. 
E-5 State Chief Information Security Officer. 
F-6 State Chief Information Officer and appropriate staff. 
G-7 
There is no single individual; our response process includes various 
stakeholders depending on the incident. All cyber incidents are coordinated 
through the Office of the Chief Security Officer. 
H-8 State Chief Information Security Officer. 
I-9 State Chief Information Security Officer. 
J-10 Director of Access and Threat Assessment/Response. 
K-11 Chief Information Security Officer. 
L-12 State Chief Information Security Officer. 
M-13 State Chief Information Security Officer. 
N-14 
We use an Information System Incident Response Team (ISIRT) that has an 
Incident Commander. This person could vary according to who is on-call. All 
incidents are recorded by the State Information Technology Services Division, 
Information System Security Officer. 
O-15 State Chief of Office of Information Security. 
P-16 
We have a statewide Incident Hotline that is staffed by the state’s Incident 
Response Team. The state’s Incident Response Team is staffed under the State 
Chief Information Security Officer. 
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State Key 
Question 2. Who is the key State individual that would be contacted for a State 
Cyber Incident? 
Q-17 
State Chief Information Security Officer, Deputy State Chief Information 
Security Officer, or Lead Incident Responder. 
R-18 
Legislation identifies the State Chief Information Officer who has designated 
the State Chief Information Security Officer to handle cyber security incidents. 
S-19 
State Chief Information Officer if statewide catastrophic potential; all other, 
primary Point of Contact is the Information Technology Security Group led by 
the Chief Information Security Officer.  
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Table 5.   Answers to Question 3 
State Key 
Question 3. What Office/Department/Section does that key State individual 
work for that would be contacted for State Cyber Incident? 
A-1 Please review the links and gather the appropriate responses to the State level questions as defined from the policies at our State web site. 
B-2 Department of Administration / Enterprise Technology Division / State Security Office. 
C-3 State Security Office within the Department of Information Systems. 
D-4 
Department of Administration, Government Information Technology Agency, 
Statewide Information Security and Privacy Office (SISPO), State’s CISO and 
Privacy Officer (PO).  
E-5 Office of Information Security. 
F-6 Bureau of Information Technology Services. 
G-7 Department of Technology and Information. 
H-8 
Agency for Enterprise Information Technology. This Governor and Cabinet 
Agency houses the Office of Information Security which, by law is responsible 
for receiving all computer security incidents in State government. 
I-9 Office of the CIO / Department of Administration / Enterprise Security Team. 
J-10 Information Technology Division / Security Office / Access and Threat Assessment/Response Group 
K-11 
Department of Technology, Management and Budget / Office of Enterprise 
Security / Risk Management Section. 
L-12 Office of Administration / Information Technology Services Division / Information Security Management Office. 
M-13 
State Information Security Division / Department of Information Technology 
Services. 
N-14 
Information System Security Office / State Information Technology Services 
Division / Department of Administration. 
O-15 State Office of Information Security. 
P-16 
Office of the state CISO / Department of Administrative Services / Enterprise 
Security Office. 
Q-17 State CISO, Deputy CISO, and the Lead Incident Responder. 
R-18 
The state Information Technologies Agency which is led by the state CIO. The 
CIO is appointed by the Governor and the CISO is hired by the CIO. 
S-19 
Department of Information Technology. If catastrophic event, the state 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management is engaged.  
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Table 6.   Answers to Question 3A 
State Key 
Question 3A. How are reports gathered for a State Cyber Incident? 
Note: States with “no response” to Question 3A provided answers prior to this 
new question being posed.  
A-1 No response.  
B-2 No response.  
C-3 Usually verbally with regular updates, also gather reports from technical resources to evaluate the malicious activity on the state network. 
D-4 Via a secured Incident Management web portal that has multi-secondary feeds.  
E-5 
Our state utilizes an open customizable application that tracks incidents and 
identifies security issues. 
F-6 Acquisition of logs from infrastructure components (firewalls, server, IPS, etc.), and coordination with the help desk for incident management. 
G-7 No response.  
H-8 No response.  
I-9 No response.  
J-10 Through tools and a ticketing reporting system. 
K-11 No response.  
L-12 On an ad hoc basis. 
M-13 
A security incident reporting guideline document and a security incident 
reporting form has been created and provided to our customers. Once an 
incident has been identified, our customers are to submit the report form, via 
email or fax. We are in the process of creating an online reporting application 
that our customers will be able to use to submit the incident information. 
N-14 No response.  
O-15 Currently a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) form is used. In the near future web site with timestamp will be used. 
P-16 
Agencies are required by statute and policy to report agency information 
security incidents to the state Security Incident Response Team (SIRT). Those 
reports are made initially by telephone call but follow-up information gathering 
may be done by email or internal mail. 
Q-17 Through a state online portal.  
R-18 
Calls can come to the state help desk, directly to the CISO/CIO, or through an 
online reporting form. 
S-19 
If potential incident the Information Technology Security Group (ITSG) point 
of contact, which logs the reported event, conducts the analysis, and coordinates 
necessary remediation/mitigation.  
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Table 7.   Answers to Question 3B 
State Key 
Question 3B. Is there a requirement that State Cyber Incident be reported? 
Note: States with “no response” to Question 3B provided answers prior to this 
new question being posed. 
A-1 No response.  
B-2 No response.  
C-3 Yes there is a requirement.  
D-4 Requirements for reporting state incidents are found in state statute.  
E-5 It is legislated and the state can take system offline.  
F-6 Yes, through various federal regulatory and compliancy law and state statutes.  
G-7 No response.  
H-8 No response.  
I-9 No response.  
J-10 Yes there is a requirement. 
K-11 No response.  
L-12 If it meets certain requirements. 
M-13 Yes there is a requirement. 
N-14 No response.  
O-15 Yes, through recent state statutes. 
P-16 
Yes, agencies are required by statute and policy to report information security 
incidents to the SIRT. 
Q-17 Yes – Through this Internet portal.  
R-18 
The executive branch agencies are required to report within 24 hours of when 
they discovered or should have discovered the incident. The executive branch 
agencies do not include all of the higher education institutions. 
S-19 Yes, via a security incident response policy and procedure.  
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Table 8.   Answers to Question 3C 
State Key 
Question 3C. What level of involvement was your State engaged, with the 
coordination of the development of the DHS National Cyber Incident Response 
Plan (NCIRP)? 
 
Note: Seven other states not recorded here were involved in NCIRP 
development meetings as shown in NCIRP partner collaboration documents.  
A-1 
Yes. The State, through the MS-ISAC, participated with Cyber Storm III where 
the NCIRP was exercised. Additionally, our state participated in a statewide 
cyber security tabletop exercise sponsored by our Emergency Management 
Agency, which was produced under the advice of the DHS and FEMA. The 
purpose of the exercise was to provide participants with an opportunity to 
evaluate current concepts, plans, and capabilities for a response to a cyber attack 
against the state’s computer networks and systems. The exercise was modeled 
after the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). 
Multiple local, state, and government entities were involved in the exercise 
which included border state representatives. 
B-2 No. 
C-3 Did not respond to the question.  
D-4 Did not respond to the question. 
E-5 
The State Chief Information Security Officer was not involved.  
Note: Data shows they were involved as recorded in NCIRP development 
meeting documents with this State partner. 
F-6 Did not respond to the question. 
G-7 Not involved directly but kept up to date on the progress through National Association of State Chief Information Officers and MS-ISAC. 
H-8 
We had minimal involvement and provided some comments. Would have liked 
to have been part of a workgroup.  
I-9 
State was given the opportunity to review for comments, but by the time it got 
to State CISO desk, it was too late for CISO to review it and provide the 
comments, so CISO just reviewed the draft.  
State Chief Technology Officer was asked by National Association of State 
Chief Information Officers to provide input and he passed it to CISO. CISO was 
to reply by e-mail. 
J-10 Did not respond to the question. 
K-11 
Chief Information Security Officer was not personally involved but one of his 
colleagues was a reviewer. 
L-12 Did not respond to the question.  
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State Key 
Question 3C. What level of involvement was your State engaged, with the 
coordination of the development of the DHS National Cyber Incident Response 
Plan (NCIRP)? 
 
Note: Seven other states not recorded here were involved in NCIRP 
development meetings as shown in NCIRP partner collaboration documents.  
M-13 No. 
N-14 Input was provided through MS-ISAC. 
O-15 Did not respond to the question. 
P-16 No. 
Q-17 
Involved in the National Association of State Chief Information Officers 
Security and Privacy work group and provided feedback on the Plan draft 
through that forum. 
R-18 Not sure with absolute certainty. 
S-19 We had opportunity to provide input as a MS-ISAC active member.  
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Table 9.   Answers to Question 4 
State Key 
Question 4. How does your State define a National Significant Cyber Incident? 
A-1 Please review the links and gather the appropriate responses to the state level questions as defined from the policies at our state web site. 
B-2 
Our state has long since recognized the difficulties in making this 
determination, unless it is a large scale incident affecting interconnects with the 
federal government. Without significant improvements in the information 
sharing between the various states and federal government it is nearly 
impossible to make this determination on a day-by-day basis regarding our daily 
threats. Thus, our state partnered with the MS-ISAC and they feed all our threat 
traffic up to the federal SOC for evaluation.  
C-3 I don’t know that we would be the entity defining that term. 
D-4 
We do not categorize incidents as National, State or Local. Best practices 
dictate using High, Medium, Low risk rating scheme. 
E-5 We don’t have a definition for a National Significant Cyber Incident. 
F-6 Any event which affects multiple states, regions or the entire country. 
G-7 Incidents that impact critical infrastructure, national processes, and the national economy. 
H-8 
A Significant Cyber Incident is a set of conditions in the cyber domain that 
requires increased national coordination. This increase in national coordination 
is triggered when the National Cyber Risk Alert Level (NCRAL) system 
reaches Severe or Critical.  
 75 
State Key 
Question 4. How does your State define a National Significant Cyber Incident? 
I-9 
Though we may change it, we reference an older National Cyber Alert Indicator 
program definition:  
 
The following criteria set forth is the recommended agency actions and 
notification procedures for each alert level: A. Low (Green)—Indicates a low 
risk. No unusual activity exists beyond the normal concern for known hacking 
activities, known viruses or other malicious activity. 
B. Guarded (Blue)—Indicates a general risk of increased hacking, virus or other 
malicious activity. The potential exists for malicious cyber activities, but no 
known critical exploits have been identified, or known exploits have been 
identified but no significant impact has occurred. 
C. Elevated (Yellow)—Indicates a significant risk due to increased hacking, 
virus or other malicious activity which compromises systems or diminishes 
service. Known vulnerabilities are being exploited with a moderate level of 
damage or disruption, or the potential for significant damage or disruption is 
high. 
D. High (Orange)—Indicates a high risk of increased hacking, virus or other 
malicious cyber activity which targets or compromises core infrastructure, 
causes multiple service outages, multiple system compromises or compromises 
critical infrastructure. At this level, vulnerabilities are being exploited with a 
high level of damage or disruption, or the potential for severe damage or 
disruption is high. 
E. Severe (Red)—Indicates a severe risk of hacking, virus or other malicious 
activity resulting in wide-spread outages and/or significantly destructive 
compromises to systems with no known remedy, or debilitates one or more 
critical infrastructure sectors. At this level, vulnerabilities are being exploited 
with a severe level or wide spread level of damage or disruption of Critical 
Infrastructure Assets.  
J-10 When it affects more than one state, or when MS-ISAC defines one.  
K-11 
Large-scale cyber incident that overwhelms government and the private sector. 
That requires national coordination. 
L-12 An adverse, organized event originating from the Internet that targets local, state, federal, and private entities. 
M-13 
We do not have a specific definition for a national cyber incident. We would 
rely heavily on information that we receive from MS-ISAC for national cyber 
security events. 
N-14 
We do not have a definition for a state cyber incident. Our state uses the 
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) definition for “incident” [United States Department of Commerce, 2011, 
p. 89].  
O-15 No formal definition. Inferred by term. 
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State Key 
Question 4. How does your State define a National Significant Cyber Incident? 
P-16 
We have no definition for a National Significant Cyber Incident. However, we 
work closely with MS-ISAC & DHS US-CERT and would follow-up with our 
contacts in our state if advised of a national incident. 
Q-17 
Security Incident Category 1 (Critical/High) 
The agency has determined that other organizations’ systems are affected, such 
as business partners or outside organizations. 
R-18 
A formal definition has not been created to my knowledge. Anything that 
involves multiple states would likely trigger a national cyber incident. 
S-19 
Threats, attacks, disruptions, emergencies or disasters which impact national 
processes and economies including state and local government, private sectors 
and public.  
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Table 10.   Answers to Question 5 
State Key 
Question 5. Who is the key State individual that would be contacted for a 
National Significant Cyber Incident? 
A-1 Please review the links and gather the appropriate responses to the state level questions as defined from the policies at our state web site. 
B-2 
It would depend on the scale. Our governor, the Department of Military and 
Veteran Affairs, Homeland Security Division or the State Security Office all 
may be contacted depending on the incident, which individual discovered it, and 
the type of incident.  
C-3 State Chief Information Security Officer. 
D-4 
The state’s Infrastructure Protection Center that is supported 24/7, that 
immediately coordinates with the Network Operation Center / Security 
Operation Center function and the state’s Department of Administration / 
SISPO State’s CISO and PO. 
E-5 State Chief Information Security Officer. 
F-6 State CIO and appropriate staff. 
G-7 
Department of Technology and Information 
Chief Security Officer 
Department of Safety and Homeland Security 
State Emergency Management Agency 
State Police High Tech Crimes Unit  
H-8 
The Domestic Security coordinators in the Department of Law Enforcement and 
the Department of Management Services and the state CISO. 
I-9 State CISO. 
J-10 Director of Access and Threat Assessment/Response. 
K-11 Governor’s Homeland Security Advisor. 
L-12 CISO. 
M-13 The state Chief Information Security Officer. 
N-14 
We use an ISIRT that has an Incident Commander. This person could vary 
according to who is on call. All incidents are recorded by the state Information 
Technology Services Division, Information System Security Officer. 
O-15 Chief of Office of Information Security. 
P-16 
We have a statewide Incident Hotline that is staffed by the State Incident 
Response Team (SIRT). The SIRT is staffed under the state Chief Information 
Security Officer. 
Q-17 CISO, Deputy CISO and the Lead Incident Responder. 
R-18 
The CISO and/or the CIO. Depending upon the classification of “National 
Significant Cyber Incident” it may be the State Department of Emergency 
Management or the State Office of Preparedness. 
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State Key 
Question 5. Who is the key State individual that would be contacted for a 
National Significant Cyber Incident? 
S-19 
The Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) Director who 
would engage the Department of Information Technology (DOIT) CIO. 
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Table 11.   Answers to Question 6 
State Key 
Question 6. What Office/Department/Section does that key State individual 
work for that would be contacted for National Significant Cyber Incident? 
A-1 Please review the links and gather the appropriate responses to the state level questions as defined from the policies at our state web site. 
B-2 
Governor’s Office, Department of Military and Veteran Affairs, Homeland 
Security Division, or the Department of Administration, Enterprise Technology 
Division, State Security Office. 
C-3 State Security Office within the State Department of Information Systems. 
D-4 
The state’s Infrastructure Protection Center that is supported 24/7, that 
immediately coordinates with the Network Operation Center / Security 
Operation Center function and the state’s Department of Administration / 
SISPO State’s CISO and PO. 
E-5 Did not respond to the question. 
F-6 Bureau of Information Technology Services (BITS).  
G-7 
Department of Technology and Information 
Chief Security Officer 
Department of Safety and Homeland Security 
State Emergency Management Agency 
State Police High Tech Crimes Unit  
H-8 
State Department of Law Enforcement, Department of Management Services 
(DEM) and Agency for Enterprise Information Technology (AEIT). 
I-9 Office of the CIO/Department of Administration/Enterprise Security Team. 
J-10 Information Technology Division, Security Office, Access and Threat Assessment/Response Group. 
K-11 State Police / Emergency Management Division. 
L-12 Office of Administration, Information Technology Services Division, Information Security Management Office. 
M-13 
State Department of Information Technology Services / Information Security 
Division. 
N-14 
Department of Administration / State Information Technology Services 
Division / Information System Security Office. 
O-15 Office of Information Security. 
P-16 
The Enterprise Security Office in the Department of Administrative Services 
(the CISO’s office). 
Q-17 
Office of Administration (OA) / Office Information Technology (OIT) / Office 
for Information Security (OIS). 
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State Key 
Question 6. What Office/Department/Section does that key State individual 
work for that would be contacted for National Significant Cyber Incident? 
R-18 
The CISO and CIO who work for state Information Technologies Agency. 
S-19 Department of Safety, Homeland Security and Emergency Management. 
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Table 12.   Answers to Question 7 
State Key 
Question 7. What alerting methodologies or procedures do your State use for a 
Cyber Incident notification?  
A-1 Please review the links and gather the appropriate responses to the state level questions as defined from the policies at our state web site. 
B-2 
We have a formalized and published incident response plan, to include an 
incident response team that includes, state, federal and private industry 
specialist as members. 
C-3 Email, text, phone, emergency notification system if warranted. 
D-4 
The Network Operation Center notifies agencies’ Information Security Officer 
(ISO) and PO regarding specific potential low risks for mitigation based on 
workflows and procedures.  
State Infrastructure Protection Center (SIPC) communicates alerts (internal and 
external) to agency ISOs and POs for High/Medium risk remediation based on 
workflows and procedures.  
Agencies comply with statewide privacy policy. 
Annual statewide Policy/Standards Compliance Assessment process ensures 
that agencies/vendors are aware of, in compliance with and when required 
implementing remediation/mitigation plans to correct gaps. 
SISPO has authority to disconnect noncompliant agencies from statewide 
network. 
E-5 Did not respond to the question. 
F-6 E-mail, telephone, and help desk escalation procedures. 
G-7 E-mail, subscription services, telephone, and Reverse 9-1-1. 
H-8 
SharePoint/Alerting tool to all the Information Security Managers in state 
government, state Department of Law Enforcement, DEM and AEIT. 
Secure MS-ISAC Portal 
E-mail. 
I-9 Did not respond to the question. 
J-10 E-mail and MS-ISAC portal. 
K-11 We utilize the Multi-State ISAC reporting process. 
L-12 Phone and e-mail. 
M-13 
We review alerts that we receive from various groups and organizations (MS-
ISAC, Microsoft, IBM, DHS US-CERT, etc.). We provide the alerts to our 
customers via a statewide list and via our web page. 
N-14 
Our ISIRT uses phone, e-mail, an automatic alert system, and face-to-face 
communication, depending upon the event and any outage that is sustained. 
O-15 Targeted notification to key ISOs, Fusion Center, and Infragard. 
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State Key 
Question 7. What alerting methodologies or procedures do your State use for a 
Cyber Incident notification?  
P-16 
The SIRT maintains a list of agency Incident Points of Contact that we use to 
establish communications with agencies in the event of an incident. This 
includes e-mail addresses, telephone and cell phone numbers. We periodically 
send general-notification security alerts to our list of agency contacts (which 
includes some local government contacts). When working with agencies, we 
primarily work through their Points of Contact but will also jump to their ISO, 
CIO or director if necessary. For incidents with potential public exposure, we 
leverage our state communications office to manage press notifications. For 
incidents with law enforcement ramifications, we either work with the state 
police or leverage contacts in the FBI Cyber Crimes unit. 
Q-17 
We use the following state policies, procedures, forms, and standards. ITB-
SEC024.doc - IT Security Incident Reporting Policy 
OPD-SEC024A - IT Security Incident Reporting Procedures 
OPD-SEC024B - IT Security Incident Reporting Form 
STD-SEC024C - Computer Incident Response Technology Standard 
R-18 
Security contacts exist at each agency as well as our Department of Emergency 
Management and the State Fusion Center. If the cyber incident is significant 
enough, all parties will be notified of the issue. If it is localized to specific 
agencies, they are notified. 
S-19 
For non-catastrophic, situational awareness notifications are provided for 
distribution. For catastrophic where the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
would become engaged and/or activated, WebEOC would be utilized.  
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Table 13.   Answers to Question 8 
State Key 
Question 8. What is a predominant cause of a State Cyber Incident? 
• Insider. 
• Hacktivist. 
• Cyber Criminal. 
• Individual Hacker. 





Note: “Cause” elaborations are included when provided by the state. 
A-1 Please review the links and gather the appropriate responses to the state level questions as defined from the policies at our state web site. 
B-2 
Cyber Criminal This is by far the greatest number of incidents in the state, 
but this is closely related to Industrial and Technology 
Espionage. It is hard to make a determination of the 




The state believes this is closely related to the Cyber 
Criminals category and it is difficult to make a positive 
determination on many of our incidents. 
C-3 Cyber Criminal 
D-4 
Cyber Criminal On-going and persistent threat. 
Individual 
Hacker 
Mostly targeting vulnerable website for defacement 
purposes, or vendors trying to make a business case for 
providing risk vulnerability services. 
Other  Careless (non-malicious), overworked, unaware 
employees/vendors not following process/procedures or 









G-7 Insider Cyber Criminal 
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State Key 
Question 8. What is a predominant cause of a State Cyber Incident? 
• Insider. 
• Hacktivist. 
• Cyber Criminal. 
• Individual Hacker. 











Industrial and Technology Espionage 
I-9 
Insider Though this is a primary concern for me, we actually have 
not had any incidents identified in this category since I’ve 
been in this position.  
Cyber Criminal This is by far the category that impacts us most often. 








I prepared for this, but we’ve had no evidence that there 










Industrial and Technology Espionage 
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State Key 
Question 8. What is a predominant cause of a State Cyber Incident? 
• Insider. 
• Hacktivist. 
• Cyber Criminal. 
• Individual Hacker. 





Note: “Cause” elaborations are included when provided by the state. 
L-12 Cyber Criminal 
M-13 
Cyber Criminal The majority of the incidents involve malware and 
viruses. 
N-14 
Cyber Criminal  
Individual Hacker 




Other Nation State—Information Gathering. 
General Observation—Attribution is not always 
available.  
General Observation—List of causes is somewhat 
myopic. 
P-16 
Cyber Criminal  
Individual Hacker 
Other Loss or theft of physical information security assets such 












Question 8. What is a predominant cause of a State Cyber Incident? 
• Insider. 
• Hacktivist. 
• Cyber Criminal. 
• Individual Hacker. 





Note: “Cause” elaborations are included when provided by the state. 
Terrorism—Exploiting 
R-18 
Cyber Criminal Recently we primarily see malware exploits and attempts to 
steal credentials and money. 
Other We have had all types of cyber incidents throughout the 
years. While they now focus on malware to steal money and 
credentials, we have had hacktivist, insider threats, and 
individual hackers. Determining motives can also be 
difficult so it is possible espionage may have been involved. 
S-19 
Other Human error or users unaware of the impact of their 
actions. 
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Table 14.   Answers to Question 9 
State Key 
Question 9. How does your State currently respond to a State Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a State cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 
• DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) utilized? 
• Other—Explain. 
A-1 
Please review the links and gather the appropriate responses to the State 




The State Security Staff runs a security operation 
center internal to the state during normal business 
hours but we heavily rely on the MS-ISAC for our 




The state has a strong relationship with our Protective 
Security Advisor and routinely keeps them informed 
regarding our situational awareness for cyber threats 
and incidents. 
MS-ISAC Our State is one of the founding members on the MS-
ISAC services. We are strategically aligned with the 
MS-ISAC on all our threat monitoring and security 
services. 
Other The State has a strong partnership with the FBI and 
we provide information and awareness of all our 
threats to them. 
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State Key 
Question 9. How does your State currently respond to a State Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a State cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 





A team is activated in the event of a significant cyber 




We would notify the director of the Department of 
Emergency Management. 
MS-ISAC We would notify the MS-ISAC through their portal or 
by phone. 
Other InfraGard9 Members Alliance would be notified if the 




The function—State Infrastructure Protection Center 
(SIPC) and the office—Statewide Information 
Security and Privacy Office (SISPO).  
State Fusion Center Primarily a law enforcement (sworn officer) function 
that focuses on Critical Infrastructure Protection for 
the private sector. 
                                                 
9 InfraGard is an information sharing and analysis effort that serves the interests and combines the 
knowledge base of a wide range of members. InfraGard is a partnership between the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the private sector, but it also includes an association of businesses, academic institutions, 
state and local law enforcement agencies, and other participants. 
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State Key 
Question 9. How does your State currently respond to a State Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a State cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 




Not a priority—all funding for Incident Management 
is the state’s. 
MS-ISAC MS-ISAC provides Point of Contact support for 
interacting with DHS, DHS US-CERT, and FBI. 
Other ISAC Utilize State Network Operation Center to prevent, 
monitor, and remediate at perimeter. State CIO 
Council, ISO / PO Community of Interest Governance 
body, with statute/policy monitoring/compliance 
enforcement to ensure that business practices and 
control are in place. The SIPC function manages 
incident documentation, workflow, and 
communications. The SISPO oversees entire Incident 
Management activity statewide. 
Other  Support FBI cyber function. Also work with state’s 
Department of Emergency Management and Military 
Agency (DEMA) to support Statewide Emergency 
Response and Response Plan (SERRP) Cyber Annex 




Question 9. How does your State currently respond to a State Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a State cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 





State Information Security Operations Center (ISOC). 
MS-ISAC Only for incidents that would change our state MS-
ISAC Cyber Alert indicator. By changing our Cyber 
Alert indicator, MS-ISAC would coordinate 
information gathering and sharing processes with us 
and other states. 
Other  In some cases, we would contact the state’s Bureau of 




Utilize the state’s DOIT operations center.  
The operations center is manned with state staff 
computer operators with specific escalation 
procedures and staff to contact.  
State Fusion Center There is a separate fusion center which can be utilized 
in a significant national event. 
Homeland Security 
Advisor 
The Homeland Security Advisor is utilized when 
working with the MS-ISAC and the DHS US-CERT 
during incident response activities. 
MS-ISAC Information sharing and collaboration with U.S. states 
and territories. Emergency response in significant 
national events. 
DHS NCCIC Through the state Fusion Center. 
DHS National 
Operation Center 




Question 9. How does your State currently respond to a State Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a State cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 





State has an operation center that would be used. 




The state HSA would be part of the incident response 
team. 





Emergency Operations Center, MS-ISAC Cyber 
Security Operations Center, state’s Network Operation 
Center, NCCIC and DHS US-CERT would all be 
working together. 
State Fusion Center State CISO is a member of the Domestic Security 
Task Force, Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention 




The HSA would be utilized, but they are not very 
engaged in cyber issues. 
MS-ISAC See other answers. 
DHS NCCIC See other answers.  
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State Key 
Question 9. How does your State currently respond to a State Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a State cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 





In theory, the Bureau of Homeland Security 
Emergency Operation Center would be used. Planning 
to exercise this is being conducted.  
Homeland Security 
Advisor 
We have been in contact with our HSA, but it is 
sporadic. 
MS-ISAC By far, this is the organization that we depend on the 
most. We send meaningful information to them and 





We coordinate through the state’s Security Operation 
Center in one of our major cities. All coordination, 
correlation and tracking of events.  
State Fusion Center Information sharing is conducted.  
MS-ISAC All incidents during an event (not a single incident) 




Our department has a formal Incident Command 
System type process that gets activated during an 
incident.  
State Fusion Center We send cyber-related information to the Fusion 
Center for their situation awareness. 
MS-ISAC They are notified of major incidents. 
DHS NCCIC Through the MS-ISAC. 
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State Key 
Question 9. How does your State currently respond to a State Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a State cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 




Through the MS-ISAC. 
DHS NICC only 
small instances of 
this 
Through the MS-ISAC. 




Our Operation Center would be used primarily for 
customer updates and information distribution. 
MS-ISAC Our state has a strong relationship with the MS-ISAC 





We have a formal plan with a designated site and 
backup site. 
MS-ISAC Used for research and information purposes. 
O-15 
State Fusion Center They would be notified. 
Homeland Security 
Advisor 
Would be used as a pass through to Federal Officials. 




Question 9. How does your State currently respond to a State Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a State cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 
• DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) utilized? 
• Other—Explain. 
Other DHS US-CERT analysis would be utilized.  
Communicate with key private sector individuals with 





The SIRT, although not an operations center, leads 
and coordinates multi-agency incident response 
activities. The SIRT also performs technical and 
forensic analysis for agencies. 
MS-ISAC Provide incident information and coordinate for multi-
state incident exercises. In the event of activity we 
detect with potential multi-state impact we would 
leverage MS-ISAC for communications and contacts. 
Other Depending upon the nature and scope of an incident, 
the SIRT may rely upon agency incident response 
personnel and/or technical personnel at our 
consolidated State Data Center. Also, depending upon 
the scope and nature of the incident, we may involve 
our partners in law enforcement or the FBI. 




Depending upon the situation there is an emergency 
operations center or it could operate out of state 
Information Technologies Agency. 
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State Key 
Question 9. How does your State currently respond to a State Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a State cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 
• DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) utilized? 
• Other—Explain. 
State Fusion Center State Information Technologies Agency coordinates 
with the Fusion Center on any significant cyber issues. 
Homeland Security 
Advisor 
This happens through the Fusion Center or the state’s 
Office of Preparedness. 
MS-ISAC Any significant issues will be communicated out to 
the community. There have not been any significant 




If catastrophic event, the state Emergency Operation 
Center would be engaged and/or activated. 
MS-ISAC If catastrophic event, the State Emergency Operation 
Center would be engaged and/or activated. 
Other For routine reported events, the IT Security Group 
logs and investigates internally.  
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Table 15.   Answers to Question 10 
State Key 
Question 10. How would your State respond to a National Significant Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a National cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 
• DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) utilized? 
• Other—Explain. 
A-1 
Please review the links and gather the appropriate responses to the state level 
questions as defined from the policies at our state web site. 




We would activate our team in conjunction with the state’s 
Department of Emergency Management. We would 
respond to the event from the state emergency operations 
center. 
MS-ISAC We would communicate with the MS-ISAC via the portal 
and by phone. 





The state Network Operation Center, with agencies, SIPC, 
and SISPO would support/facilitate internal remediation, 
while the DEMA Emergency Operation Center would 




Question 10. How would your State respond to a National Significant Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a National cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 
• DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) utilized? 
• Other—Explain. 
MS-ISAC Use the MS-ISAC to share cyber remediation information 





State Information Security Operations Center. 




The Department of Information Technology Operations 
center would be used for coordinating response in a 
National cyber event. 
State Fusion 
Center 




In a National cyber event, the DHS Security Advisor 
would be contacted. 
MS-ISAC Communication with the MS-ISAC members, utilization of 
the fusion center there, coordination with other states’ 
fusion and operation centers. 
DHS NCCIC In a national cyber event, the NCCIC will be contacted and 
included and state efforts. 
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State Key 
Question 10. How would your State respond to a National Significant Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a National cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 





In a national cyber event, the DHS US-CERT at the DHS 
National Operation Center would be contacted and 
included and state efforts. 
DHS NICC In a national cyber event, the NICC will be contacted and 
included and State efforts. 




Unified Command would be established at state’s 
Emergency Management Agency. 
State Fusion 
Center 





HAS would be member of Unified Command. 
MS-ISAC MS-ISAC would be member of Unified Command. 




Emergency Operations Center, MS-ISAC Cyber Security 
Operations Center, state’s Network Operation Center, 




State CISO is a member of the Domestic Security Task 
Force, Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Committee, 
Domestic Security Oversight Council and Fusion Center. 
 99 
State Key 
Question 10. How would your State respond to a National Significant Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a National cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 





The HSA would be utilized, but they are not very engaged 
in cyber issues. 
MS-ISAC See other answers. 




In theory, the Bureau of Homeland Security Emergency 
Operation Center would be used. Planning to exercise this 




We have been in contact with our HSA, but it is sporadic. 
MS-ISAC By far, this is the organization that we depend on the most. 
We send meaningful information to them and they provide 




We coordinate through the state’s Security Operation 
Center in one of our major cities. All coordination, 
correlation, and tracking of events.  
State Fusion 
Center 
Information sharing is conducted.  
MS-ISAC All incidents during an event (not a single incident) are 
reported and coordinate through the MS-ISAC.  
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State Key 
Question 10. How would your State respond to a National Significant Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a National cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 









Information is exchanged between State Fusion, SEOC, 




The governor’s Homeland Security Advisor is Director of 
State Police. That directs emergency management. 
MS-ISAC Information is regularly passed between MS-ISAC and the 
States in the form of alerts and conference calls.  




Information comes via the MS-ISAC. 
DHS NICC Information comes via the MS-ISAC. 




Our Operation Center would be used primarily for 
customer updates and information distribution. 
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State Key 
Question 10. How would your State respond to a National Significant Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a National cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 
• DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) utilized? 
• Other—Explain. 
MS-ISAC We would stay in close contact with the MS-ISAC to make 




We have a formal plan with a designated site and backup 
site. 








As a pass through to federal officials. 
MS-ISAC Notification, analysis, and coordination.  




The SIRT, although not an operations center, leads and 
coordinates multi-agency incident response activities. The 




Question 10. How would your State respond to a National Significant Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a National cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 
• DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) utilized? 
• Other—Explain. 
MS-ISAC We use the MS-ISAC provided incident information and 
work with them for multi-state incidents, if one were to 
come up. In the event of activity we detect with potential 
multi-state impact, we would leverage MS-ISAC for 
communications and contacts. 
Other We have worked with the FBI on multi-state criminal 
computer information security incidents. We would also 
rely on our agency and state data center personnel to assist 
with response to a National Significant Cyber incident. 




Depending upon the situation there is an emergency 
operations center or it could operate out of state 
Information Technologies Agency. 
State Fusion 
Center 
State Information Technologies Agency coordinates with 




This happens through the Fusion Center or the state’s 
Office of Preparedness. 
MS-ISAC Any significant issues will be communicated out to the 
community. There have not been any significant outbreaks 
to cause us to utilize them. 
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State Key 
Question 10. How would your State respond to a National Significant Cyber 
Incident?  
• State has an operation center that would be used for a National cyber 
event? 
• State Fusion Center utilized? 
• Homeland Security Advisor utilized? 
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
utilized? 
• Communications ISAC utilized? 
• Information Technology ISAC utilized? 
• Other ISAC utilized? 
• DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC) utilized? 
• DHS National Operation Center (NOC) utilized? 





Catastrophic CDP would be utilized for communications 
and to guide response efforts.  
MS-ISAC Event would be reported to MS-ISAC and advice solicited. 
Contact with other impacted states would be initiated. 
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APPENDIX C.  NATIONAL CYBER INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN 
QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE 
Significant Cyber Incident: A Significant Cyber Incident is a set of conditions in 
the cyberspace that requires increased national coordination. This increase in national 
coordination is triggered when the National Cyber Risk Alert Level (NCRAL) is set at 
Severe or Critical. 
The NCRAL system takes into account the threats, vulnerabilities, and potential 
consequences across the cyber infrastructure and provides an indication of the overall 
national cyber risk. 
 
Normal Current or predicted cyber threat actor behavior, system/hardware 
vulnerabilities or activities—pose no significant risk to CIKR 
sector core critical functions or operations.10 
 
Guarded Vulnerability and cyber incident reporting and analysis indicate 
that information and communication technology may be disrupted 
or degraded or at greater risk of disruption or degradation, 
however, impact on core critical functions across the CIKR sectors 
is manageable by the responsible owners and operators. Standard, 
“steady state” protective measures, procedures, and monitoring are 
generally adequate to protect systems. However, enhanced security 
measures may be required. 
 
Elevated Current or predicted cyber threat actor behavior, system/hardware 
vulnerabilities or activities place core critical functions across the 
CIKR sectors at serious risk of being degraded or disrupted. 
Preparedness, mitigation, or response measures are able to be 
maintained indefinitely as a part of normal operations. 
 
                                                 
10 While core critical functions will differ across industries and sectors, an example of critical 
functions for the IT sector are outlined in the IT Sector Risk Assessment. These critical functions support 
the IT sector’s ability to produce and provide high-assurance products, services, and practices that are 
resilient to threats and can be rapidly recovered. These critical functions include: Produce and Provide IT 
Products and Services; Provide Domain Name Resolution Services; Provide Internet-based Content, 
Information, and Communications Services; Provide Internet Routing, Access and Connection Services; 
and Provide Incident Management Capabilities. 
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Severe Current or predicted cyber threat actor behavior, system/hardware 
vulnerabilities are compromising, degrading and/or destroying 
core critical functions across or within one or more CIKR sectors. 
Preparedness, mitigation, or response measures are only possible 






Current cyber threat actor behavior, system/hardware 
vulnerabilities and activities have resulted in the total or near total 
compromise and disruption across multiple CIKR sectors. 
Mission-critical cyber systems have been seriously and widely 
degraded, or destroyed threatening the homeland security, national 
security or continued operation of government or CIKR functions. 




During a Significant Cyber Incident, DHS, through its National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), coordinates national response efforts and 
works directly with Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments and private 
sector partners. 
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APPENDIX D.  NATIONAL CYBER RISK ALERT LEVEL SYSTEM 
SUMMARY 
The National Cyber Risk Alert Level (NCRAL) system is the United States’s 
national alert mechanism focused on risk in cyberspace, including risk to other CIKR 
sectors originating from cyberspace. It is a tool for maintaining public and private sector 
awareness of and stimulating preventative, consequence management or response actions 
to, known and potential threats to: 
 
• Information and communications technology infrastructure,  
• Critical information that transits or resides on that infrastructure, and 
• Risks to critical infrastructures or key resources that may be disrupted via 
cyberspace. 
As an alerting mechanism among public and private sector partners, the NCRAL 
contributes to shared situational awareness, supports decision making, encourages 
information sharing, and informs cyber incident management activities. During a 
Significant Cyber Incident, or in anticipation of one, the NCRAL serves as a catalyst and 
driver for nationally-coordinated response actions, specifically across the U.S. 
Government. 
The NCRAL system leverages the shared situational awareness developed by the 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) to inform the 
NCRAL alert level. There are five risk alert levels of increasing severity: 
 




The NCRAL system enables an evaluation of risk to the information and 
communication technologies11 that support the Nation’s security, public health and 
safety, economic vitality, and way of life. It examines the following risk factors: 
                                                 
11   The NCRAL also considers the risk to information that is stored and transmitted via information 
and communications technologies. 
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• Threats: Activities, actors, and event indicators of a potential cyber incident. 
• Vulnerabilities: Physical or logical feature or operational attribute that renders an 
entity, asset, system, network, or geographic area open to exploitation or 
susceptible to a given hazard. 
• Consequences: Effect of an event, incident, or occurrence, including abnormal 
performance or degradation of critical national functions. 
 
Determining National Cyber Risk 
The NCCIC and its partner organizations conduct risk management activities, 
which are aggregated by the NCCIC to inform national-level risk and suggest appropriate 
national and sector-level prevention and protection activities. The NCCIC also conducts 
continual analysis of private and public sector risk/alert levels and the information that 
contributes to setting those alert levels. 12 This in turn allows DHS to examine changes in 
other alert levels to assess and communicate national-level risk. 
To determine national cyber risk, both cyber and non-cyber activities are analyzed 
to determine overall risk of disruption, degradation or physical damage to IT and 
communications infrastructure and the Nation’s other CIKR sectors. This includes 
incorporating sector-specific risk assessment models and frameworks, and identifying 
intersections among them. 
The NCCIC determines cybersecurity risk and establishes proactive protective 
measures by: 
 
• Conducting a comprehensive, on-going, and collaborative assessment of the 
national cyber common operational picture. This occurs in consultation with 
critical partners using information from all sources and taking into account threat, 
vulnerability and consequence information. 
• Maintaining awareness of other risk/alert systems within the federal, defense, and 
state and local communities and critical infrastructure sectors.  
• Conducting analysis of the capabilities that affected communities and 
organizations have to effectively counteract threats and mitigate vulnerabilities or 
consequences. 
• Validating technical analysis and evaluation of relevant threat, vulnerability, and 
incident information and impact to information and communication technology. 
                                                 
12 Examples of some of these risk/alert systems and protocols are the NCRAL, CYBERCON, 
INFOCON, and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) alert levels such as the Multi-State 
ISAC, Information Technology ISAC and Financial Sector ISAC. 
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• Estimating the possibility for the rapid escalation of a threat and/or exploitation of 
a vulnerability, and the potential impact of the escalated risk to critical mission 
and/or business operations. 
• Determining potential national-level consequences affecting Nation’s security, 
public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of life. 
• Assessing likely effectiveness of available mitigation capabilities to prevent or 
diminish the impact of risk. 
These factors provide the basis for determining the current level of cyber risk to 
national-level critical functions. Figure 1 is an overview of the assessment methodology 




Figure 1.   NCRAL System High-Level Overview (from DHS-CS&C, 2011)  
Setting the Alert Level 
The threat, vulnerability and consequence data related to the impact to CIKR are 
analyzed to determine: 
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• Probability of the impact (Is this a potential or suspected impact? Are there 
observed indications that the impact is occurring or about to occur?) 
• Extent and severity of the potential/observed impact (Is the potential/observed 
impact minimal, moderate, significant or severe?).13 
 
This is done by: 
• Identifying the type of threat (e.g., zero-day, malicious code, distributed denial of 
service attack). 
• Determining the characteristics or parameters of the threat (e.g., successful or 
unsuccessful, widespread or localized, release date known / unknown, indications 
or confirmed intelligence reporting. 
• Identifying and analyzing the vulnerable information and communication 
technology (e.g., mission critical, non-mission critical). 
• Determining the impacted CIKR sector(s) and critical functions. 
 
The assessment will be aggregated by the NCCIC in collaboration with its other 
CIKR partners and evaluated against the impact descriptions provided in Table 1 to 
determine the overall alert level. Each level describes general, but not all-inclusive 
conditions that may exist at each alert level, and identifies broad guidelines for reporting, 
mitigation, analysis, and other actions. 
                                                 
13 Minimal: activity results in minimal disruption, normal operations is sufficient for response management; Moderate: 
activity results in technology not being substantially degraded, normal operations or temporary surge operations 
required for response management; Significant: activity causes degradation technology and normal operations 
overwhelmed and surge response is indefinitely necessary; Severe: activity is or projected to be highly disruptive, 
response operations are overwhelmed. 
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Table 16.   National Cyber Risk Alert Levels 
Label Description  Expected NCCIC Actions Suggested Community 
Actions 
Normal Current or predicted cyber 
threat actor behavior, 
system/hardware 
vulnerabilities or activities 
pose no significant risk to 
CIKR sector(s) core 
critical functions14 








order to maintain 
a common 
operating picture 
to assess cyber 
risk 
 





























- Continue to patch 
systems regularly 





                                                 
14 While core critical functions will differ across industries and sectors, an example of critical 
functions for the IT sector are outlined in the IT Sector Risk Assessment. These critical functions support 
the IT Sector’s ability to produce and provide high-assurance products, services, and practices that are 
resilient to threats and can be rapidly recovered. These critical functions include: Produce and Provide IT 
Products and Services; Provide Domain Name Resolution Services; Provide Internet-based Content, 
Information, and Communications Services; Provide Internet Routing, Access and Connection Services; 
and Provide Incident Management Capabilities. 
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Label Description  Expected NCCIC Actions Suggested Community 
Actions 
Guarded Vulnerability and cyber 
incident reporting and 
analysis indicate that 
information and 
communication technology 
may be disrupted or 
degraded or at greater risk 
of disruption or 
degradation, however, 
impact on core critical 
functions across the CIKR 
sectors is manageable by 
the responsible owners and 
operators.  Non-cyber 
reporting indicates that 
conditions may exist for 
escalating risks these core 
functions:   
 





risk of disruption 
or degradation to 
systems that 
support critical 
functions to the 
organization / 
sector 
• Current attacks 


























• NCCIC and 
members of the 




the potential of 
rapid risk 
escalation  







• Ensure the 
organization is 
prepared to 
respond to an 
incident that 
poses a greater 





















Label Description  Expected NCCIC Actions Suggested Community 
Actions 
Elevated Current or predicted cyber 
threat actor behavior, 
system/hardware 
vulnerabilities or activities 
place core critical 
functions across the CIKR 
sectors at serious risk of 
being degraded or 
disrupted. 
 
- Evidence exists of 
successful attacks that 
affects systems critical 
to CIKR critical 
functions, to include 
command, control and 
communication 
systems, but does not 
substantially degrade 
them 










able to be 
maintained 
indefinitely as 
a part of 
normal 
operations 
• NCCIC increases 
its operational 






reporting on a 
more frequent 
basis, as required 
by the incident 
• Increased 
operational 
















entities, and with 
those who may 



















within the Sector 
and from DHS,  
to reduce the risk 
























Label Description  Expected NCCIC Actions Suggested Community 
Actions 
Severe Current or predicted cyber 




and/or destroying core 
critical functions across or 



























or response measures are 
only possible at a 
significant and indefinitely 
surged posture 
• NCCIC increases 
its operational 




with partners and 
reporting on a 
more frequent 
basis, as required 
by the incident. 




entities, and with 
those who may be 
targeted or 
affected. 
• Activation of 
Cyber UCG 
Senior Officials. 
• Potential need to 























for Elevated.  
• Participate, as 
needed in Cyber 
UCG activities, 
including the 
development of the 
incident action 
plan. 




with the NCCIC 
and among other 
participating 
organizations.  











within the Sector 





Label Description  Expected NCCIC Actions Suggested Community 
Actions 
Critical Current cyber threat actor 
behavior, system/hardware 
vulnerabilities and 
activities have resulted in 
the total or near total 
compromise and disruption 








































reporting on a 
more frequent 
basis, as required 
by the incident. 
• Leadership, from 
the White House 
to Cyber UCG 
Senior officials 
are engaged.  
• Activation of 
COOP/COG 
functions may be 
necessary.  
• Activation of 
ESF-2 and/or 
other ESFs may 
be appropriate. 




















as outlined in the 
incident action 










within the Sector 
and from DHS, 







The Secretary of Homeland Security establishes the alert level on the 
recommendation of the Assistant Secretary for the DHS Office of Cybersecurity and 
Communications (CS&C) and the Cyber UCG.15 When determining whether to 
recommend transitioning to a higher NCRAL level, the Assistant Secretary should 
consider: 
• Whether the conditions outlined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
(HSPD-5) and the National Response Framework (NRF) have been triggered. 
These include, but are not limited to: 
• A Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the 
assistance of the Secretary of DHS. 
• The resources of State, local, tribal, and territorial authorities are overwhelmed, 
and Federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate State, local, tribal, 
and territorial authorities.  
• More than one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved 
in responding to the incident. 
• The Secretary has been directed to assume responsibility for managing the 
incident by the President. 
• The potential costs of implementing designated security readiness actions. 16 
 
These same conditions and criteria will be used to evaluate a lowering of the alert 
level. While the cycle of input, analysis, level determination, and dissemination is a 
continuous process, at minimum the Assistant Secretary will consider whether or not the 
NCRAL should be set at a lower level every 24 hours, until it reaches Normal. 
 
Communicating the Alert Level 
Once established, the alert level is communicated from the NCCIC to public and 
private sector partners, including UCG Staff, Senior Officials and their organizations, the 
White House, the NOC, all CIKR sectors via ISACs, SSAs and the NICC, States17 and 
the international community as appropriate. It is also communicated to the public through 
approved external affairs channels and procedures. This communication will be 
accompanied by appropriate, specific, and actionable information to include: 
                                                 
15 The Secretary may choose to delegate setting the NCRAL, especially at lower severity levels. 
16 The participation of federal agencies, CIKR owners and operators, and private sector stakeholders 
are critical for assessing the implications and potential costs of raising or lowering the NCRAL. 
17 Primarily through the MS-ISAC. 
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• Conditions or triggers that have been observed or anticipated that justify a change 
in risk alert level; 
• The actual or predicted consequences or impacts that are appropriate to a 
particular risk alert level; 
• Recommended actions that the stakeholder communities should be take; and 
• Information and reporting requests from the NCCIC to maintain shared situational 
awareness.  
 
DHS coordinates the public affairs response at any alert level and the NCCIC 
External Affairs Officer is responsible for working with the Assistant Secretary for 
CS&C, Cyber UCG, DHS Office of Public Affairs, White House Communications, 
Public Information Officers, and National Joint Information Center (NJIC) to 
communicate to public and external stakeholders. 
The NCCIC will continue to develop and refine specific NCRAL procedures, 
distribution and coordination mechanisms, suggested actions, and detailed descriptions of 
alert level triggers as part of the NCRAL CONOPS.  
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